At a large and influential gathering of defense industry and policy types last week, the Chief of Naval Operations (a.k.a the top uniformed leader in the Navy and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) showed a little leg and informed the gathering of what to expect from the latest round of fleet architecture and force structure deliberations. Here’s a taste:
“My view on carrier aviation remains unchanged: I think we need 12 carriers,” Gilday said. “I think we need a strong amphibious force, to include probably nine big-deck amphibs and another 19 or 20 [smaller amphibious warships] to support them.”
“Sixty destroyers and probably 50 frigates. Seventy attack submarines and a dozen ballistic missile submarines. About 100 support ships. And probably, looking into the future, 150 unmanned” vessels, he said.
There is a lot to unpack here, but that is why you pay me. Well, not really, I do this for free, but you know what I mean.
First, what he describes here is essentially a 500+ ship Navy. Given that the Navy is currently south of 300 ships, there’s a lot of work to do. The horizon is out to 2045, which is a good thing as there are a limited number of places left to build ships, carriers, and submarines, and to build at the rate he suggests is going to take serious capital investment.
Second, the numbers here are pretty consistent with the analysis that was done in the last presidential administration, which ought to be seen as a good thing (the consistency, that is). What ought to be seen as a “less good thing” is that the CNO is undercutting his own service’s competence by inferring that he had confidence in the plan because the analysis was led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. All this does is enshrine the perception that the Navy cannot do this on its own, which is patently untrue, but reinforces the way business has been done for four years now (the previous administration appeared to lose patience and confidence in the Navy’s ability to do force structure assessments after a string of accidents and scandals). The CNO should be saying that he has confidence in OSD’s numbers because they match what the Navy came up with.
Third—the time for “My view(s)” and “I think(s) and “…about XXX” from the CNO is over. If and when the CNO talks about these things going forward, he should use one and only one phrase: “The Navy’s requirement is….”. Fund it. Don’t fund it. Take issue with it. Do whatever you want with it—but this is the requirement and it will only change as a result of strategy, technology or threat—NOT as a result of available resources.
Fourth, I am not a fan of the number of amphibious ships, as I think the Commandant of the Marine Corps has created a sense of momentum for harvesting “legacy” amphibious force structure to fund his idea for a Light Amphibious Warship (LAW), the numbers of which are contained presumably in the CNO’s “…100 support ships…” above. To this point, I think the logic behind the LAW is far less persuasive than the logic that flows from the utility, flexibility, and desirability (by geographic combatant commanders) of the amphibious fleet. We need MORE big deck amphibs, and we need MORE amphibious lift. I’m prepared to believe we need LAW too (when convinced), but not at the cost of the other capability.
Speaking of resources, planning, designing, buying, building, operating, maintaining, modernizing, and crewing a Navy of this size is going to require a considerable increase in funding. The last time I ran these numbers, my estimate was that the Department of the Navy would need $40B a year in additional funding over and above the insufficient resources it currently receives—every single year with adjustments for inflation, as far as the eye can see. This will not go down easy in the Pentagon, the White House, or on Capitol Hill. But them’s the facts, and them’s the requirements, and it will be the job of Navy leadership to make the case for the resources based on the requirements as they exist, and then to explain what capabilities and or capacities will NOT be attainable if the necessary resources are not provided. Again—and I will repeat this from the highest mountaintop—the requirement is not a function of available resources, it is a function of strategy, technology, and threat.
Finally, because the planning horizon for this desired naval buildup extends over 23 years, it is a wish, an aspiration, a vision. These things will look official when the Navy puts it in writing, but in a nation with annual budgets (or at least that’s what we’re supposed to have), looking this far into the future is not a wise investment in time. Where should one look for signs of seriousness? Well, the next budget (FY23), which will be submitted in about a month or so. What does serious look like? It looks like buying more things from hot production lines, including ships, airplanes, and weapons, stuff that we can build NOW to start on this path. It means money for shipyards and dry-docks and aviation depots that will help increase capacity to build, maintain, and modernize a fleet of the size under consideration. It means money for programs to encourage/build out the skilled labor workforce that we will need to sustain this fleet—a national level effort designed to “make the lunch-pail sexy again” by pointing out the benefits of hard, honest, well-paid industrial work to a generation who’ve been sold on the lie that they have to go to college to be someone.
In other words, when it comes to an ambitious plan to increase the size and power of the Navy, show me the money.
Ukraine
Moving on to another weighty subject, as I write this on Saturday the 19th of February, President Biden has told us that he believes the Russians will invade, and nearly 200,000 Russian troops have encircled Ukraine in order to do so. There is an ominous feeling in the air. To my great embarrassment, I am considerably ignorant as to the history and the grievances in play, and I have little to offer in terms of wisdom or expertise. All I have is fear.
I wonder what it was like to be sitting in a comfy office with one’s multiple degrees and internationalist outlook in the summer of 1914 or 1939? Were I magically transported back to those times, what would I have thought was ahead? Would I have had a clue as to the coming cataclysm(s)? Would I have thought that while there was a chance for some localized warfare, but that the U.S. would not be a part of it and that things would sort themselves out?
I found myself wondering about these things again this morning, as I have done for a few weeks now. Wars involving great powers, even lesser great powers like Russia, have no script, and there is a predictable unpredictability to them. Could the world be embroiled in something substantial two years from now? Will we once again, remind ourselves that whatever pretense we have as a species to civilization is a façade, that we are still quite capable of slaughtering each other in vast numbers, and that one of the most pernicious ends of technology is to make that slaughter more efficient?
I hope that answers to the questions above are forestalled for another day, and that Putin decides that his showy display of national tail-feathers has been sufficient to remind the world that Russia matters. In the meantime, I’ll just sit here with my anxiety and deal with it.
Etc.
That’s correct, Matt. You and your Trumpenproletariat friends are indeed, no longer conservatives.