Although the Democrats won the Presidency and the Senate in 2020 (already in control of the House), the margin of victory was razor-thin, even after taking into account the most corrupt and dangerous presidency in living memory. One must remember that had the Orange Duce had only shut his mouth about the election and campaigned hard in Georgia, the Senate would still be controlled by Republicans and we would not be having a conversation about a $3.5T social revolution bill and a $1T infrastructure bill after already spending trillions of dollars on COVID relief and the cottage industry of bennies it spawned.
But he did not shut his mouth, he did do the Republican candidates in Georgia harm, and both the Article I and Article II branches are in control of the Democrats. So why are Democrats so unhappy? Why are they so divided?
Part of the reason is because their division is masked by the control the (white, liberal, well-off) portion of the coalition has of the media, including social. To exist on Twitter, one would believe that the most salient issues before the American public are use of proper pronouns, the elimination of cow flatulence, and the proliferation of electric vehicle charging stations. The “progressive” left’s echo chamber is deep and wide, and while they are doing a wonderful job convincing each other of their virtue, they are having a tough time with the American Public.
All of this is wonderfully distilled in this weekend’s New York Times, where Ezra Klein introduces us to Democratic Data Dude David Shor, in a piece that lays these divisions bare. Shor has the temerity to suggest that many woke positions are unpopular (or at least, less popular) than other positions, and that to win elections, Democrats should concentrate on policy options and discussions that reflect more popular policies. This seems unobjectionable, except for the many objections Klein writes of, most of which come down to “his (Shor’s) conclusions don’t fit my worldview and so they should be ignored.
Shortly after reading this piece, the following Tweet appeared:
This pretty much makes Shor’s argument for him. A wildly popular and bi-partisan infrastructure bill could pass Congress and be signed today. That the Democratic candidate for Governor in the Commonwealth of Virginia is asking the question “Why haven’t we passed this infrastructure bill?” is an indication of the deep denial in the Democratic Party nationwide. Of COURSE McAuliffe knows why “we” haven’t passed the infrastructure bill. It is because the Woke Lobby of his party is holding it hostage to $3.5T worth of considerably less popular spending.
Care for some more on the dissatisfaction on the left? Have a gander at J.V. Last’s Monday offering this week a portion of which I reproduce below:
Last week I Sarah invited me onto The Focus Group. The episode is out. You can subscribe on Apple Podcasts here or listen to it here.
We watched a group of nine Democratic voters in Pennsylvania who ran the gamut—from Bernie-stans to a lady who had voted for Trump in 2016.
Every single one of them thought Biden was doing a bad job.
But that’s not the bad news.
Every single one of them thought things were crappy in America right now.
Still not the bad news.
Not one of them liked Biden personally. They all viewed him as a normal, lying politician.
Now we’re there. Here’s the really bad news:
None of them believed that Republicans were to blame for the administration’s failures.
If you are a Democrat, this should scare the living death out of you. Because it means that your own voters:
Think the environment is bad.
Blame you for it being bad.
Don’t like you in the first place.
Aren’t even seeing you as the lesser evil.
No happy talk. No wish-casting. No both-sides-ing.
Good stuff.
BONUS NAVY NATIONAL SECURITY STUFF
I am infamous for long-form tweet storms that probably ought to be essays somewhere, but I don’t have the patience for the submittal/editing process. Yesterday, I posted one that looks at the emerging Biden Defense Strategy, and it reaches conclusions with which I am uncomfortable. I reproduce it now in something resembling essay form.
The following Twessay (that’s right, I made up a word for Twitter Essay or a Long Form Tweet) on force structure and defense spending is written in response to a piece on @WarOnTheRocks by @staciepettyjohn and @becca_wasser https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/dont-sweat-the-small-stuff-getting-force-design-right-in-the-next-national-defense-strategy/ . This piece itself appears to be a response to an earlier piece on at WOTR https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/what-to-expect-when-youre-expecting-a-national-defense-strategy/ with which I am far more in agreement.
I realize the Titan who runs WOTR will upbraid me for not submitting this as an essay, but I have a short attention span and needed to get this off my chest. I recommend re-rolling it with @threadreaderapp or one of the other services that do this for you. As I have in the past, my approach to discussing this piece will be to take it as it comes, with direct quotes and discussion thereof. And here…we…go….
“This (Integrated Deterrence) expansive and ill-defined concept does not promote confidence that the Department of Defense is likely to set clear priorities in its strategy”. Couldn’t agree more. We’re off to a great start.
“The Biden administration should narrowly focus the Defense Department on high-end deterrence against China and Russia instead of strategic competition”. As I will come back to many times in this Twessay, I believe this is exactly what the Biden Team is doing.
“This strategy would enable the dual nuclear and conventional modernization that is desperately needed to strengthen deterrence, both now and in the future, at current levels of defense spending” I simply don’t accept this limitation. I understand the desire to be responsive to the resources provided, but if the resources provided are a large part of the problem, starting from square one in this manner is overly limiting.
“Urgent change at a significant scale is required to secure the nation today and tomorrow, but this will not occur if the next National Defense Strategy promotes too much of the same.”….as long as it doesn’t cost any more?
“This was due in part to the fact that while the 2018 strategy prioritized high-end deterrence, it also stressed the “reemergence of long-term strategic competition” with China and Russia.” Whether it was in the 2018 strategy or in the current administrations musings, the continuing attempt to separate out deterrence and competition befuddles me. The military’s role in strategic competition IS deterrence.
“Now there are calls for the 2022 National Defense Strategy to further widen its aperture so that it not only identifies strategic competition and warfighting as core missions…” Any effort to eliminate or diminish strategic competition from the military’s responsibilities will by definition, reduce the effectiveness of its deterrent value. Because deterrence is the product, the end-state—of effective competition.
“Congress, for example, has provided an additional $24 billion increase to the Fiscal Year 2022 defense budget to buy more aircraft, ships, and weapons that might not be needed or even wanted.” And this was done in no small measure because the general thrust of this essay was rejected.
“It is an open question whether the Biden administration takes the good from the 2018 National Defense Strategy — the hard choices made to explicitly prioritize preparing for war against China — and improves on it, or whether the Department of Defense returns to strategy-making as a device to achieve consensus” Aside from the essay’s doubts about “integrated deterrence” as a term, this is not an open question. Integrated deterrence is the smokescreen that OSD is using to de-emphasize military competition EXACTLY as this article would advocate.
“Trying to straddle all of these competing demands would likely result in a force-planning construct that aims to compete day-to-day while simultaneously building readiness and capability to deter China and Russia, with an emphasis on China”. Winner, winner, chicken dinner! This is EXACTLY what is required, and what the previous article on WOTR advocated for.
“Such a strategy seeks to do it all — hedge against multiple threats while competing today and deterring the wars of tomorrow. It raises the level of ambition for and demands on the U.S. military because of the multiple threats that they will need to both compete against and deter.” The continuing distinction between strategic competition and one of the primary ways the military contributes to it—deterrence—escapes me.
“Although this approach sounds like a prudent way of hedging against future uncertainty, it will result in a force that cannot defend the homeland or American allies against a Chinese or Russian attack.” WITHIN CURRENT RESOURCES! If it is prudent, then we should pay for it.
“Additional resources are not going to resolve this dilemma. If extra funding is used to buy more capabilities that are not relevant to high-end deterrence, they may exacerbate this problem over time and further entrench constituencies opposed to the changes needed. Additional capacity also increases the likelihood that defense leaders take their eye off the Indo-Pacific and employ military forces in other regions for missions that can be fulfilled by other parts of the government. Time and time again we have seen the Department of Defense struggle to multi-task. It has taken a herculean effort by multiple administrations to shift the defense bureaucracy’s focus to China…” 1) so don’t buy capabilities not relevant to high end deterrence (which is a way militaries compete) 2) As for the employment of military forces, this is a political decision 3) DoD struggles to multi-task? Does anyone really believe this given the mind-numbing number and variety of things DoD does EVERY SINGLE DAY? And 4) what “herculean” effort? This administration is awash with the same people who in the Obama Administration put the clamps on talk and planning that was considered provocative toward China.
“The force associated with this strategy could contest, but not halt, an invasion of Taiwan or the Baltics, and it could not overturn a sub-conventional land grab in either region.” Does it contest it more than the current force? Does it raise the cost of the decision to initiate?
“The department’s senior leaders should embrace some near-term risk and make the hard choices needed to set the future force in the right direction. This means sacrificing capacity and the ability to fight simultaneous wars to maintain enough forces with enhanced capabilities to win one large fight against the most consequential threat..” The extent to which the authors believe they are raising controversy here is notable. They are essentially advocating exactly what this administration is trying to do.
“this strategy could simultaneously fund nuclear and conventional modernization and enable a deterrence-by-denial strategy against China and Russia” This claim is worth investigation. My sense is that without military competition, deterrence by denial is impossible. Some version of deterrence by punishment may be available, but with its concomitant weaknesses.
“The strategy narrowly defines the military’s role to warfighting and eschews the concept of competition, which primarily occurs in the non-military realm and is the responsibility of other parts of the government.” 1) competition IS part of deterrence and 2) that part of the strategic competition carried out by the military is unique and cannot be accomplished by any other part of the government, unlike many non-military aspects.
“Because it enhances deterrence, this strategy can reduce the risk of a conflict with China and Russia in the near term and over the long run. It makes key investments in existing capabilities, mainly advanced long-range munitions and enablers, and improvements in posture to strengthen deterrence now.” I simply don’t accept that this approach enhances deterrence. Also how is “improvements in posture” NOT military competition?
I hope this Twessay continues the excellent dialogue occurring about these questions. Fin.