How the Army Can Help the Navy Get To a Better Fleet Architecture
I realize many of your join me here for little glimpses of modern life and occasional wit. But I also use this forum to get my thoughts about sea power out and about, and this is yet another of those.
I am proud of pretty much every bit of writing I’ve done on Navy matters and fleet architecture, but two efforts stand out. The first from 2015 was a report I worked on with two wonderful Hudson Institute colleagues, Seth Cropsey and Tim Walton, called “Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, The Joint Force, and High-End Conflict”(you can watch a pretty fair video of the formal release of the report here). The second was a report undertaken with my friend Bryan Clark called “Restoring American Seapower: A New Fleet Architecture for the United States Navy” Both are popping-good reads, and you should put aside sufficient time in your busy lives to digest them.
I cite these two works because it occurred to me recently that they should be thought of as two parts of a three-part fleet architecture argument that I have not yet fleshed out, but which I introduce here. Although I’ve given it away in the title, the bottom line here is that an Army program has the capacity to unleash the Navy’s current fleet architecture.
The Aircraft Carrier
We are very particular about our aircraft carriers in the United States, so particular that Congress has mandated a force of no fewer than 11 in public law (although we need 16 as our Hudson report above details). Our aircraft carriers exist for two fundamental tasks which are sea control and power projection. These kinetic tasks compromise the capability and capacity necessary to present a powerful conventional deterrent during peacetime, which is the basis for the protection and sustainment of our national security and our economic vitality. During wartime, sea control and power projection are vital to the Joint Force in virtually every scenario, but especially in conflict with China.
Our aircraft carriers are large (very large) and nuclear powered, requiring one refueling across a fifty year lifespan, while carrying several million gallons of liquid fuel for its weapon system, a.k.a the “air wing”. Perhaps the most important discriminant in the U.S. convention of naming aviation platforms “aircraft carriers” is the presence of large, airborne early warning airplanes (currently the E-2D), which additionally provide airborne command and control.
Modern U.S. aircraft carrier designs have been in no small measure challenged by the large (81 foot wingspan) E-2D, and accommodating several of them is a driving force in carrier size. The large, powerful radar atop the fuselage provides hundreds of miles of detection against both air and surface targets, and when operating at relevant mission altitudes, detection range is even more impressive. To my mind, the ability to operate capable airborne early warning aircraft is the thing that distinguishes an aircraft carrier from all other ships. The E-2D is the crown jewel of the air wing.
I was serious above when I suggested you read the Hudson study on aircraft carriers. What we did in that report was to take head-on, the suggestion by carrier-critics that the aircraft carrier was obsolete and had a limited and declining role in modern, high-end warfare (re: China). I stand by that work and its conclusions convey. We need carriers for high end warfare, and we simply do not have enough of them.
Amphibious Assault Ships
The United States operates another class of ships that has a large flight deck and can accommodate both fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft. These ships are known as “amphibious assault” ships, or more commonly, “big deck amphibs”. The U.S. is particular about these ships too, with Congress requiring a force of not fewer than 10 to be maintained. These are not aircraft carriers, although they…carry aircraft. Amphibious assault ships are designed to project air power in support of Marines operating ashore, as part of an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) consisting of the aforementioned big deck and two smaller amphibious platforms (LPD/LSD). This formation is largely dependent upon other elements of the operating fleet—including the carrier strike group—for defense and sea control missions. Most other nations on earth—were they fortunate to have one of our LHD/LHA assault ships, would call it an aircraft carrier. We do not, both because of its limited mission set and to maintain an important distinction. Like aircraft carriers, we have an insufficient number of amphibious assault ships.
Fleet Architecture
When Bryan Clark and I worked (along with a stellar team) on the 2017 Fleet Architecture, we were doing so at the direction of the Congress, which required the Navy to have two independent assessments (in addition to its own) of the future Navy. The Navy picked us, and we gave them what was required. Again—read the report if you really want to get a sense of what we were thinking.
For the purposes of THIS essay, we took as a given in that study that the Navy would not appreciably grow the aircraft carrier force, both because of the expense involved and industrial base concerns. We did not anticipate the degree to which the present administration would be hostile to continuing aircraft carrier acquisition, their delight in operating them notwithstanding.
Recognizing the necessity of tactical aircraft in a China war scenario, we decided that the 10 amphibious assault platforms—each of which is being upgraded to accommodate the very capable F-35B aircraft—could no longer simply be applied against U.S. Marine Corps ground operations. We did not advocate changing the names of these ships to aircraft carriers, but we wanted them to act more like aircraft carriers (by contributing to sea control and naval power projection). Others agreed, and the concept of the “Lightning Carrier” was born.
Over time, the number of F-35B’s required to animate the Lightning Carrier caused angst in USMC budgeting shops, and the idea has lost some steam. I would like to suggest a “Lighting Carrier 2.0” concept, one that doesn’t simply lard the big deck with more fighters, but which gives it the airborne early warning and battle management capability it needs.
Enter Army FLRAA
The Army recently began a program known as the “Future Long Range Assault Aircraft” or FLRAA, with the aim of fielding an aircraft that was fast, had long range, and could move people or cargo. They selected a Bell tilt-rotor aircraft modeled on their V-280 Valor technology demonstrator.
I believe a variant of this aircraft could close a very serious capability gap and provide the Navy/Marine Corps team with additional sea control and power projection capability EVEN as the Navy continues to pursue the industrial base required for a larger number of aircraft carriers. What I am suggesting mirrors to some extent the approach taken by the Royal Navy to providing AEW to its aircraft carriers—the Merlin Crowsnest AEW Helo.
The FLRAA airframe could accommodate mission computers and operators in its cargo bay and employ either conformal sensors or even podded applications. The reported speed of the FLRAA aircraft (in excess of 250 knots) means it can get on station quickly and remain there for extended periods at AEW mission-relevant altitudes. Some modification may be needed to the engines in order to achieve efficient operation at 20,000 feet or so, but that is not insurmountable. Not only would such a capability add to existing fleet ISR, but it could help turn the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) into a hunter-killer formation if the Navy made wise investments in expeditionary anti-ship missiles and launchers for its amphibious ships. I will make no friends in the Marine Corps when I suggest that the time has come for those ships to be more than transportation for Marines, that they must evolve to contribute more to the larger naval battle, and that the USMC operated F-35B needs to be a ship-killer too.
What is Required?
First, is the will. Second, is the resources.
The Navy should begin immediately to test this Tilt-Rotor AEW concept using its existing fleet of CMV-22 aircraft, several of which should be brought off line and configured for this mission.
These experimental aircraft would help generate mission requirements for a FLRAA variant that would operate organically from the ARG. Already hoping the piggy-back on the Army FLRAA program, the Marine Corps could take the lead in the development of this FLRAA AEW version.
Eventually, a smaller, unmanned version of this aircraft should be developed as the replacement for the aging SH-60 based helicopters that the U.S. Navy Surface Force employs from its destroyers. Current helos provide only limited ISR to a fleet that is increasingly employing longer range ant-ship missiles, and the gap between the range of those missiles and the capability of organic helos is growing.
Every time I write about needing a larger, more powerful fleet, some wag will tell me that the industrial base cannot grow fast enough to provide the number of ships we need. While I do agree that we are industrially limited, the only way to change that is to be determined to build more ships. While we build that determination and plus up that industrial base, we could get more out of the ships we have (the amphibious force) by providing key enablers like ISR/AEW and long-range anti-ship missiles.
Winter is coming.
I have been working with the RN and General Atomics on a concept where we take one of their "Mojave" short field MQ-9 variants and strap a two piece air search radar on it. With modern tech we can field a really capable air search radar in a smaller form factor than was previously possible. With the autonomous nature of the MQ-9, more than one could be aloft at once, and their endurance would be in excess of 12 hours.
I toyed around with tilt rotor AEWs against Chinese threats in Command: Modern Operations. There were a couple problems.
1. The radars you can stick on these aircraft are glorified fighter radars. They're not anywhere close to the semi-stealth-detecting, UHF APY-9. Just using F-35Bs in a combined CAP/AEW role was actually superior. F-35s can reach altitude and a useful range much faster and are stealthy, making enemy counter-ISR much more difficult. They could actually detect and engage the archer rather than waiting to detect the arrows.
2. There are limited spots on an LHA/D. Every tilt rotor AEW aircraft takes away an F-35B from the air wing. Since you need multiple (3-5) aircraft to maintain a persistent ISR orbit, you lose up to a fifth of your fighters. This isn't a good trade.
Another option is to just rely on land-based AEW aircraft. Perhaps just buy into the USAF E7A Wedgetail program. The Navy already flies a 737-variant in the P-8. This may not be any more expensive than developing a totally new tilt rotor AEW aircraft.