Some Additional Thoughts on the National Commission on the Future of the Navy

Signs of Life in this Unloved Effort

Way back in December of 2022, President Biden signed the legislation that among other things, created the National Commission on the Future of the Navy. Under the provisions of the law, the panel was to have been appointed and begin its work within 90 days of passing into statute, which for those keeping score would have been on or about March 22, 2023. As it is (at this writing) fourteen months past that start date with the Commission never having been empaneled, inquiring minds are left to wonder.

Department of the Navy Officials Testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee Recently. (Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Jared Mancuso)

There has been (for this delayed and unloved effort) some activity of late, to include news of additional appointees and insertion of language in the 2025 version of the law that created the Commission, language extending its mandate until July of 2025 (an additional twelve months past its current expiry).  As an appointed member of the Commission, I am enthusiastic at the prospect of finally getting to work, but as a neophyte observer of how things get done in our nation’s capital, I have yet to square the circle on how a Commission whose legal end date is July 1, 2024 can be extended without signed legislation. But I will leave those things to the experts and just continue to throttle my work life on the off-chance that the system figures this out.

I have written about this Commission before, and some of you may be sick of hearing about it. Way back (before the President signed the enabling legislation and before I was appointed to the Commission), I put down some thoughts that expounded on Congressional tasking, which included the following extended pull quote. I’ve added (in bold italics) some thoughts that have occurred to me in the year and a half since I wrote this:

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“Regarding force structure:

• What is the desired number of large, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers to support war plans, conventional deterrence, and naval diplomacy?

  • Given the (predictable) reliance on carrier air power in response to terror attacks on Israel and other Middle East security matters and its centrality in all other contingencies, long term carrier force levels should be front and center. Two of the three 30 year shipbuilding plans predict a dip in carrier force levels to 10 carriers (vice the legally required 11 and the Navy desired 12) by 2040, and in all three the force is at 9 for periods during the 2040’s. This is untenable, and the recent Defense Budget submission in which the planned CVN acquisition is pushed out of the plan only makes things worse. The Commission should consider strongly advocating for acquiring a new CVN every four years JUST TO MAINTAIN CURRENT FORCE LEVELS.

• What is an effective mix of satellite, land-based, and ship-based ISR platforms, one that provides for effective peacetime targeting and that also reserves a sufficient number of low-observable platforms that can make the transition to combat operations?

• In the space of less than four years, the Marine Corps requirement for large amphibious ships went from 38 to 31 with little debate even as the threat perception has increased. Given the flexibility and capability of these ships in both peacetime operations and amphibious assault, is this decline in numbers wise? It appears that amphibious force structure is being cannibalized in order to create resources for a new class of ship (Light Amphibious Warship or LAW) to support USMC’s emerging force design. What is the rationale for not retaining the 38 amphibious ship requirement AND building LAW?

  • The Commission should thoroughly review amphibious shipping requirements, to include consideration of a force sufficient to posture three afloat ARG/MEU formations continuously and indefinitely. This crisis response force is not replicated anywhere else in the DoD inventory, and it must be sufficient to the need.

  • The Commission should thoroughly review both the CONOPS and the requirements for the LAW (now LSM) and opine as to whether the requirements and CONOPS are aligned (are the required speed and range figures for the ship sensible given the likely missions?)+

• Irrespective of the number of amphibious ships, what is the continuing rationale for not equipping them with offensive weapons? This one utterly boggles my mind. Always has.

• What is the right ratio of Large Surface Combatants to Small Surface Combatants in a future force? Does the total number of surface combatants change this ratio? How and why? See next bullet.

• The Navy currently has no stated plan or timeline to bring in a second shipyard to build its new CONSTELLATION Class Frigate. What is the window for bringing on a second yard to increase production and create competition? The Navy desires a “learning curve” be established in the yard building the ship before considering construction at a second yard on a ship already delayed several years. While this provides near-term budgetary flexibility (not having to resource additional ships takes the pressure off), it delays 1) fleet capacity increase and 2) the opportunity to alter the ratio of Large Surface Combatants to Small Surface Combatants.

• What is an ideal timeline for transitioning from production of Flight III Destroyers to the new DDGX destroyer? What lessons can be learned from the transition from TICONDEROGA Class Cruiser construction to ARLEIGH BURKE Destroyer production? If the action in the Red Sea has taught us anything, it is that we need to put the hammer down on Directed Energy (DE) weapon systems (lasers, high powered microwaves). The FLIGHT III Destroyers are the envy of the world, and building them while we get off top-dead center on the DDGX continues to make sense. But because of power and cooling restrictions on the Flight III’s (and IIA’s), we will not get to systems that truly alter the cost curve (interceptor cost vs. threat cost) until we build a new ship around a power plant sufficient to drive power-hungry DE systems of sufficient capability.

• What are the prospects for the submarine industrial base to be able to build two Block V VIRGINIA Class SSNs per year AND the new ballistic missile submarine, the COLUMBIA Class? What are the risks and how can additional resources be applied to buy down that risk? I am torn. This is one of the areas where I need a great deal more information and understanding. On one level, I find myself in agreement with DoD in not requesting the second SSN in the 2025 budget. As long as our industrial base cannot build 2 boats a year, buying two boats a year has huge opportunity costs (industrial base enhancements, weapons, ships etc.). But NOT requesting two boats (and building a backlog that represents labor force stability for years) is a signal that industry and labor can readily interpret. This is a hard one.

• Is there a role for Fast Patrol Vessels armed with a modest number of lethal surface-to-surface missiles in the future Navy? Why has the Navy shied away from these platforms in the past, and has anything changed to warrant their fielding in the future?

• Is the early decommissioning of LCS hulls desired by the Navy short-sighted? Can they be upgraded and potentially forward based in Europe and the Middle East? Should they be?

• Both the Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV) and the Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel (MUSV) programs appear to be in caretaker status. Most of the energy in surface unmanned systems is being generated by the activities of CTF 59 in the Fifth Fleet. What has the Navy learned from CTF 59 and has that learning impacted its acquisition plans for the larger unmanned vessels?

• A 2017 Future Fleet Architecture study directed by the Congress called for the establishment of composite squadrons of unmanned surface and underwater vehicles in Northern Europe and elsewhere in the European theater (Romania). Is there merit in this idea?

• What is the Navy’s plan for expeditionary ship repair?

• What is the Navy’s plan for expeditionary re-arming? I know SECNAV is all over this, but it is yet again one of the things that the action in the Red Sea is driving home. The question is whether we listen/respond/act before we’re REALLY on the wrong end of this in the Western Pacific.

• How must the fleet logistics force change to meet the requirements of the force structures evaluated under the different resource levels?

Regarding Shipbuilding and Innovation

• Does the nation require additional public shipyards? If so, what are candidate facilities?

• Are there technologies and approaches being used in foreign shipyards that Congress can incentivize in U.S. shipyards? If this Commission ever gets off the ground, visits to major US shipyards are required, but visits to foreign yards (South Korea, Japan, Italy) are essential. Are countries with more balanced (naval/commercial) shipbuilding industries simply investing more in technology and plant improvements? Are government subsidies playing an outsized role in foreign shipyards?

• What are the drydock needs of the Navy at varying force levels and what is the plan to provide sufficient strategically located docking?

• Although this is not specifically called for in the enabling legislation, what can be done to increase production capacity of key munitions? Can the government incentivize new companies in related industries to enter the market?

• What policy/legal changes are required in order to promote additional stability and learning in serial production and reduce what appear to be predictable cost overruns in early production?

• What contractual and acquisition changes can promote additional stability and learning in serial production and reduce what appear to be predicable cost overruns in early production?

• Is there value in considering a “very low-cost” torpedo, given the number of targets to be neutralized in a China scenario and the paucity of MK 48/ADCAP torpedoes? Can advanced torpedoes be husbanded for high value naval targets while expending a low-cost variant on less capable/maneuverable platforms?

• Is there value in developing plans for “on the shelf” capability that could be relatively easily spun up under wartime conditions? Specifically, paying for the design and limited production of numerous craft (manned and unmanned) that may not necessarily be highly prized now, but which may become more desired as a conflict progresses. This applies also to munitions.”

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As I’ve written before, if you want to talk to someone in Washington who will give you more efficient and effective ways of spending inadequate resources on American Seapower, there are others in the field far better suited than I. My interest is in growing the Navy and Marine Corps, and from my reading of the enabling legislation, that is exactly what Congress desires.

We have whistled past the graveyard for far too long, first in assuming no one would rise to challenge American naval dominance and then in assuming we could “technology” our way out of this hole. We cannot. Among the answers to our problems is money and steel. Additionally, we must address persistent readiness challenges even as we grow the fleet. Our mandate from Congress ASSUMES the fleet should grow in three of the four budget levels (2023 appropriated plus 3-5% real growth, what it would take to achieve the legally required 355 ship force, and what would be required to “…meet the needs for war in two theaters—the Indo-Pacific and the Europe.”) The fourth option is what drafters of the legislation considered the baseline figure, which was FY2023 level plus inflation. Had this figure been achieved, the Navy would be in a much better place as the Commission begins its inquiry. However, short-sighted, sequestration-like caps imposed on the 2024 and 2025 budgets mean the Navy budget has lost significant buying power to inflation.

Winter is coming.