A recent reading of Herman Wouk’s novels THE HOPE & THE GLORY left me with a stronger appreciation for the relationship between time and political will/international settlement. The most suspenseful scenes are the relationships between the UN and the what the battle lines were at any given time.
I think thought should be given to this relationship. Removing a credible “denial” force would perhaps give China a diplomatic opening for a political settlement to end the war quickly, before credible US forces could coalesce in theater to give challenge. There could be a new “status quo” before we even get there.
As you point out there will to use them needs to be there, but their presence in themselves should undermine doubt. When I hear “integrated deterrence,” I hear a lot of abstractions, and not a lot of practical advice. GEN Flynn seems to hear the same thing, based on an interview I heard him do not long ago.
Well struck, sir. I am particularly galled by the continual trotting-out of Ukraine as evidence of the failure of US deterrence measures. It is perhaps the best vignette illustrating *the strength* of our deterrent posture in modern history. The care Russia has taken to avoid striking US or NATO forces, and especially NATO territory, is probably the only thing they've been careful of in the entirety o the war. Absolutely absurd argument.
I have long-running angst about deterrence. I always harken back to my undergrad days at trade school in Colorado and we read James Fallows' National Defense. He likened discussions of nuclear deterrence to theology where a bunch of big brained people discussed a bunch of theories with little data or experience to prove or disprove any of them, in other words "How many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" Basically deterrence rests on the basic formula "If I do x, my adversary will see and understand this in the way I wish and react in the way I wish and will not to the thing I don't want them to do." It seems to me highly dependent on a supreme confidence that we understand exactly how our adversary perceives our actions and can accurately forecast how they will behave based on this perception. All of that seems kind of dubious to me. Having said that, I think betting on our enemy understanding that we have the military capabilities to stop them from achieving their objectives is a far safer bet than betting that they believe we will punish them to a level they will find unacceptable relative to the goal they seek to achieve. Do we ever really know how important a goal is to them and what they might be willing to sacrifice to achieve it? Deterrence by denial rests upon a fairly, though not totally, empirical measurement of capabilities. Deterrence by punishment rests upon a not very empirical calculation of relative wills. Undoubtedly deterrence by denial ain't cheap, but that's a discussion for another day.
Regardless of how we debate this, it is doubtful our adversaries care what we call our strategy or the nuances of our force architecture's purpose. More ringing for them is 'can they achieve their purpose and is it worth it.' It seems that much of America cares (about Dollar General, yes, but) not a whit about China or Taiwan...which is what I expect the Chinese are most focused on--a politically hollow America which could not put its full purpose behind any such objective as denying the PLA. We had better get well, America.
A recent reading of Herman Wouk’s novels THE HOPE & THE GLORY left me with a stronger appreciation for the relationship between time and political will/international settlement. The most suspenseful scenes are the relationships between the UN and the what the battle lines were at any given time.
I think thought should be given to this relationship. Removing a credible “denial” force would perhaps give China a diplomatic opening for a political settlement to end the war quickly, before credible US forces could coalesce in theater to give challenge. There could be a new “status quo” before we even get there.
As you point out there will to use them needs to be there, but their presence in themselves should undermine doubt. When I hear “integrated deterrence,” I hear a lot of abstractions, and not a lot of practical advice. GEN Flynn seems to hear the same thing, based on an interview I heard him do not long ago.
Thank you!
Well struck, sir. I am particularly galled by the continual trotting-out of Ukraine as evidence of the failure of US deterrence measures. It is perhaps the best vignette illustrating *the strength* of our deterrent posture in modern history. The care Russia has taken to avoid striking US or NATO forces, and especially NATO territory, is probably the only thing they've been careful of in the entirety o the war. Absolutely absurd argument.
I have long-running angst about deterrence. I always harken back to my undergrad days at trade school in Colorado and we read James Fallows' National Defense. He likened discussions of nuclear deterrence to theology where a bunch of big brained people discussed a bunch of theories with little data or experience to prove or disprove any of them, in other words "How many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" Basically deterrence rests on the basic formula "If I do x, my adversary will see and understand this in the way I wish and react in the way I wish and will not to the thing I don't want them to do." It seems to me highly dependent on a supreme confidence that we understand exactly how our adversary perceives our actions and can accurately forecast how they will behave based on this perception. All of that seems kind of dubious to me. Having said that, I think betting on our enemy understanding that we have the military capabilities to stop them from achieving their objectives is a far safer bet than betting that they believe we will punish them to a level they will find unacceptable relative to the goal they seek to achieve. Do we ever really know how important a goal is to them and what they might be willing to sacrifice to achieve it? Deterrence by denial rests upon a fairly, though not totally, empirical measurement of capabilities. Deterrence by punishment rests upon a not very empirical calculation of relative wills. Undoubtedly deterrence by denial ain't cheap, but that's a discussion for another day.
I have spend more time re-reading this. However, this quote jumped into my mind:
“Any plan won't survive its first encounter with reality. The reality will always be different. It will never be the plan.”
Our military adversaries worry most about our capabilities.
That means we need a whole shit ton of capabilities.
Folks bitch and moan about our military spending but it is a reasonable size relative to our GDP.
3.1 percent of GDP in 2023
Bryan, I'm somewhere between you and Brian.
Regardless of how we debate this, it is doubtful our adversaries care what we call our strategy or the nuances of our force architecture's purpose. More ringing for them is 'can they achieve their purpose and is it worth it.' It seems that much of America cares (about Dollar General, yes, but) not a whit about China or Taiwan...which is what I expect the Chinese are most focused on--a politically hollow America which could not put its full purpose behind any such objective as denying the PLA. We had better get well, America.
Yep.
Denial poorly resourced is permissive.
Same for punishment.