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Matthew's avatar

I don't think one can blame LCS's failure on the "changing security environment". The culprits were:

1. Non-sensical, conflicting requirements,

2. Unwarranted faith in low TRL enabling technologies and;

3. Incompetent program management.

Ironically, the Navy has been engaged in littoral combat against a non-state actor in the Red Sea for the last 18 months and has yet to deploy a single LCS. This is literally the threat and mission it was (poorly designed) to accomplish.

It also appears that the Navy has screwed up the FFG-62. A program that should have been a 'slam dunk' (minor modification of an existing foreign design) is now anticipating a 40% cost increase and 3 year delay.

Before laying down grand plans to modify the Zumwalts into a battlecruiser we should take a clear-eyed look at the Navy's track record in shipbuilding over the last 20 years. l have near zero confidence in N96 or NAVSEA to do anything more complicated than oversee the contracting and construction of more Arleigh Burkes.

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Ric Rushton's avatar

Bryan, As usual good analysis. I also lived through the DDX-DD21-DDG1000 Saga as a resource sponsor on the Navy Staff. The truncation from 31 to 3 was a combination of the mission changing, the Navy's flawed acquisition approach, and in my view the ineffective medaling of the DoD acquisition oversight process. That coupled with SECNAV and ASN RDA arbitrary decisions on the ship design which did not help and the total ship computing environment (TSCE) which I lived through as N766 made the ship an albatross. That said, there were some very important cutting edge technologies that as they mature will be essential in future surface combatant decisions. First a couple of minor corrections. The Advanced Gun System was not actually rail gun. It was designed to fire rocket assisted projectiles that became prohibitively expensive and made worse by the class truncation. It also was fitted with MK 57 Vertical launch cells vs. MK 41. The Combat System decision was also a detractor. The decision to drop the dual band X/S band radar, driven by challenges in the signal processor decision neutralized the IAMD capability. The S Band arrays that LM designed and built were never installed. The X Band SPY3 did not have the volume search needs for true area air defense. There was a discussion with PEO-IWS to potentially replace the combat system with Aegis BL9 for the third ship which I don't believe was acted on. The contractors Raytheon and LM were not that helpful either. All said, we are where we are. These ships continue to provide great service in refining integrated electric drive and electrical systems for combat systems. support. With the USN decision to single up on surface ship combat systems via the Aegis program makes replacing the currently installed systems a great idea. The fielding of SPY6 is also an important improvement as you point out. Solid State S Band radar is essential for radar resources and capabilities as we continue to deal with ever more complicated ballistic missiles and the advent of hypersonic threats. Long range strike is also essential. These ships have aviation facilities that have huge potential as well. As for cost per hull, the cost growth was a combination of many of the acquisition factors I mentioned, but mostly the truncation to 3 ships that are to blame. These ships will play an important role as the USN moves to the next generation surface combatants. Finally, one pet peeve, it is not and never been a Destroyer. Need to update its designation based on where the mission set falls. Fix that please. As always great thoughts and analysis.

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