Besides being ridiculously expensive, which wouldn’t be so bad, if you only needed three “destroyers.” The Zumwalt’s complete lack of anti-ship missiles, anti-submarine torpedoes and long-range area-air defense missiles should make you wonder. What is this ship going to do?
The final straw is the removal of the advanced gun system. We were finally going to have meaningful shore bombardment capabilities again. Something we lost when we mothballed the Iowa class ships.
We will far better off with three or four Burke class Block 3 Destroyers for the price of one Zumwalt.
And lastly! Don’t waste anymore money on Zumwalts. And get out there and replace the Ticonderoga class cruisers, that have long since passed their freshness date.
Ok first the Zumwalt was fitted with 155 mm AGS, but it wasn't a rail gun. It's a semi projectile. With a large powder charge and a rocket assisted projectile (RAP)
Second as far a public records show, the ship isn't 901 shock qualified. No full ship shock trials that I have been able to find. Meaning it is less survivable for it's crew than the LCS (both flavors)
The ship class is a mess. It's been misshandled from the start and wouldn't exist without direct intervention of pork barrel politics.
The Navy’s force generation concpet yields roughly 1/3 of the force forward deployed, 1/3 getting ready to deploy, and 1/3 in post-deployment refit. So basically this investment will yield one forward deployed DDG-1000?
The Zumwalt class may be stealthy, but they still make noise. Those ships may need SSNs to protect them. If I was China and wanted to start something, I would be continuously tracking these ships before hand and have an SSN tracking each one. If they have the SSNs when they need them. And if the subs and crews are any good.
We spent a huge amount on designing and building the LCS and Zumwalt classes. And completed both, so far, are near useless in a fight. Now we have a frigate that's being built and designed at the same time. Probably another failure. The cost now is close to a destroyer. We'd be better off if the money was spent on more destroyers and maybe the cruisers. I guess we're lucky they're not still building battleships.
The system we have for picking senior officers has been failing America fro decades.
From where I sit we have yes men serving admirals that are yes men to senior admirals who were yes men in their time. The fighting officers that get things done don't seem to make higher ranks. At this point I think we need to take some of the decisions on new designs away from the current admirals.
I'm on the fence with a lot of this. I'm certainly hesitant to invest another dime in $7B ships that have questionable capabilities. Expending tens(hundreds?) of millions more to carry a small amount of hypersonics that are of debatable utility is tough for me to agree to. Taking a refit even further and completely replacing sensors and combat systems?? Even tougher. I'm not sure I see the CONOP spelled out clearly enough, and convincingly enough as well, to warrant the massive costs. Idk if they're envisioned as a squadron, operating alone or (??). If upgraded to Aegis/Spy6, then they could potentially protect themselves at least, but to what end? How much true impact would those hypersonic have- even if we were talking about all three ships together.
In my mind, the Zumwalts biggest strength is the power generation. Use them as test beds and places to deploy the directed energy weapons. Spend the money on getting those weapons to a production level ASAP. The Brits seem to be ahead of us on this, so buy their tech if needed. The Zumwalts could become the Atlanta-class of the 21st century. Sure, being BG escorts is far from what anyone envisioned, but they could become potent as the directed energy AAW cruiser of the future...
And frankly, I'm not fully sold on stealth-ifying ships. Sure they're harder to see from other surface ships. But the real threat of detection comes from the air. And at 30000ft, from 30+ miles away, guess what has big slab sides facing right at the aircraft?? Of course anything that flies at that range, probably dies but...
Agreed, in the modern era the only stealth ships are called subs. Major surface groups are going to have satellite surveillance almost continuously. It would be stupid go to emissions control to be "stealthy" while a bloody satellite is looking. Best bet is have your radars going full bast so you can at least detect something coming at you
To be fair, full, real time surveillance of the oceans is something nobody has. I read a paper recently about this, and paraphrasing and using round numbers, it'd take something like 22000 satellites to cover the entire SCS!! Never mind the Phillipine Sea and western Pacific, where the CVBGs would be operating as they try to push west. So, ships and groups still CAN hide in the vastness. Of course once you begin offensive operations, your general location becomes known. At that point, stealth becomes more about avoiding missile locks as long as possible, and less about being invisible. So whether extreme stealth shaping is worthwhile or not probably can't be truly quantified until after all the blue missiles have been taken off the rails...
Sure...but I'd temper that with the fact that the shipyards and builders make the same profit margin on good, properly designed ships, that they do on worthless, pointless designs. So lets put them to work building stuff that's actually combat capable and useful...
Bryan, As usual good analysis. I also lived through the DDX-DD21-DDG1000 Saga as a resource sponsor on the Navy Staff. The truncation from 31 to 3 was a combination of the mission changing, the Navy's flawed acquisition approach, and in my view the ineffective medaling of the DoD acquisition oversight process. That coupled with SECNAV and ASN RDA arbitrary decisions on the ship design which did not help and the total ship computing environment (TSCE) which I lived through as N766 made the ship an albatross. That said, there were some very important cutting edge technologies that as they mature will be essential in future surface combatant decisions. First a couple of minor corrections. The Advanced Gun System was not actually rail gun. It was designed to fire rocket assisted projectiles that became prohibitively expensive and made worse by the class truncation. It also was fitted with MK 57 Vertical launch cells vs. MK 41. The Combat System decision was also a detractor. The decision to drop the dual band X/S band radar, driven by challenges in the signal processor decision neutralized the IAMD capability. The S Band arrays that LM designed and built were never installed. The X Band SPY3 did not have the volume search needs for true area air defense. There was a discussion with PEO-IWS to potentially replace the combat system with Aegis BL9 for the third ship which I don't believe was acted on. The contractors Raytheon and LM were not that helpful either. All said, we are where we are. These ships continue to provide great service in refining integrated electric drive and electrical systems for combat systems. support. With the USN decision to single up on surface ship combat systems via the Aegis program makes replacing the currently installed systems a great idea. The fielding of SPY6 is also an important improvement as you point out. Solid State S Band radar is essential for radar resources and capabilities as we continue to deal with ever more complicated ballistic missiles and the advent of hypersonic threats. Long range strike is also essential. These ships have aviation facilities that have huge potential as well. As for cost per hull, the cost growth was a combination of many of the acquisition factors I mentioned, but mostly the truncation to 3 ships that are to blame. These ships will play an important role as the USN moves to the next generation surface combatants. Finally, one pet peeve, it is not and never been a Destroyer. Need to update its designation based on where the mission set falls. Fix that please. As always great thoughts and analysis.
I think the reason to push ahead with ZEUS would be enhanced if the Navy just decided that DDGX would be Zumwalt Fllt II. We could hedge bets and get more bang for the buck with a cheaper Flt IV Burke and a high end, Zumwalt based, cruiser. We need to get started on this now so we stop eating our numbers with more Flt IIIs than we need and all this talk about a second frigate yard. I'll hold off on the details and leave it at this.
I think we should be honest about the Burkes. They are focused on AAW. I'd suggest that IF the DDGX is going to fill the Tico/Burke slot, then delete the ASW equipment and helo facilities. That would potentially shrink the ship and make it cheaper. Yay. Add 4-5 CIWS/RAM for survivability and call it a day. I dint think risking a $2B Aegis ship for ASW is a smart choice.
Continuing along those lines, I'd bring the Connie's to an end right now, and start over with a strictly ASW focus. Hull and towed sonar with 3 helo capacity, and nothing else except CIWS/RAM.
Now if we want a high end Aegis AAW cruiser, then maybe the Zumwalt is the place to start- maybe not. But again, make it a focused, not multirole platform. If it's still needed, make sure there's room for the AAW commander. And go with the largest radar panels. Utilize the power production the ships are capable of. But I wonder if integrating the illuminator and such would be possible without losing the stealthiness(???). I think having an AAW ship that's stealthy is wise, but is it possible? Maybe we have to settle for a more conventional superstructure on a Zumwalt hull. Or maybe we only use the powerplant and scrap the rest of the Zum design (??). So many questions...!!!
First test 1997. Repeated tests with success then failure until the last test listed was in March 2024.
Question: Is any other country rich enough to spend this amount of time and money to develop such a system. Has any other country demonstrated a similar system? The Chinese?
Ideally ship and sub platform designers and resource sponsors would mimic what Naval Aviation has done with F/A-18, having a (somewhat) open architecture for sensors, weapons and comms; and the physical/data/electrical/cooling interfaces to enable timely updates within an integrated environment.
I have serious doubts that even on the current plan that there will be one destroyer ready to deploy with an operational CPS in the next three years. AGS wasn't ready for prime time, rail guns still aren't, and I'd wager the technical challenges you cite in integrating CPS will create a similar outcome. The mods you suggest could take another significant chunk of time and by then the hulls (even with little to no use on them) will be getting long in the tooth. Moreover, I question the assumptions driving urgency to put CPS on surface ships at all, but that's another argument.
Agree about time left for these hulls. Look at all the lost time since they were commissioned. At least with Ford it’s lost deployment time is amortized over a fifty year life. Keep piling up the waste: Sprus, LCS, DDG-1000.
I was the design integration manager for Ingalls. To the best of my memory, TSCE became the official name of the workstation architecture concept. I do remember briefing slides from fairly early on that used a graphic in which TSCE was the over-arching means for data flow. I will also admit that my job was to make sure all of the toys fit on the toy box, so I was not heavily invested in the finer points of data bytes.
Believe many pieces of TSCEi have gone obsolete from the OEMs. There are also other “vulnerabilities” with TSCEi in this day/age/environment. As with the ships of that late 90’s/early 00’s design , CANES and other installs are necessary and underway to replace the CFE designed TSCEi and SWAN across all those ships.
With the pace of that area of technology, I can easily see that to be the case. Thanks for you thoughts. Along those general lines of thought.... all of our ships need to be resilient. We need backups for our backups, as it were. I'm hoping that the current generation of electronic architects keep that in mind.
You forgot to mention that the shells for the 110 km range main guns would cost $800,000 each to deliver 11 kg of explosive. Severe stupidity that the project got that far. It is still doing stupid. $40 million per shot for conventional prompt strike. A self-defeating weapon because it is too expensive for the effect. The weapon the Zumwalts should be armed with is PrSM increment 2. $2 million for a 600 km range and a 90 kg warhead. Ideal for plunging straight down into the vertical launch cells of Chicom destroyers. Stop the stupidity.
For Zumwalt, yes. For Naval Gunfire support I want quad packed ER-GMLRS on very small, cheap ships. FSVs with ADL launchers on the deck. Low manning with range and firepower.
I don't think one can blame LCS's failure on the "changing security environment". The culprits were:
1. Non-sensical, conflicting requirements,
2. Unwarranted faith in low TRL enabling technologies and;
3. Incompetent program management.
Ironically, the Navy has been engaged in littoral combat against a non-state actor in the Red Sea for the last 18 months and has yet to deploy a single LCS. This is literally the threat and mission it was (poorly designed) to accomplish.
It also appears that the Navy has screwed up the FFG-62. A program that should have been a 'slam dunk' (minor modification of an existing foreign design) is now anticipating a 40% cost increase and 3 year delay.
Before laying down grand plans to modify the Zumwalts into a battlecruiser we should take a clear-eyed look at the Navy's track record in shipbuilding over the last 20 years. l have near zero confidence in N96 or NAVSEA to do anything more complicated than oversee the contracting and construction of more Arleigh Burkes.
Not sure I blamed "LCS'S failure" on the security environment. I certainly asserted the fleet architecture into which it fit was a failure. But as the only platform that survived semi-unmolested, I don't think I'd make such a direct statement
LCS are being decommissioned with six years of service life. They are fragile, overpriced and undergunned. The entire ASW module was cancelled leaving the class completely useless against an enemy with submarines (read China, Russia, Iran, North Korea). I could go on - but think you get the point.
Your Zumwalt concept would require a Navy with Division 1 level discipline and ship design skills. What we've seen from NAVSEA over the last 20 years is a drunken, poorly run Junior Varsity team.
Now I'm AF (we're the smart one. Send the offices out to fight. :-)) so what do I know. Why not take an older class dd pack it full of the latest technology, build a bunch and send them out? Point being Why does it Have To Be The Newest?
WRT to CPS, the Surface version is (as the Navy tells us) "risk reduction" for the submarine version. Putting it on a ship that is decidedly difficult to locate and track seemed sensible (to me at least).
It seems to me there is a problem in the DOD when it comes to weapons procurement.. Maybe (just MAYBE) its we have gone from "It's good enough, it'll do the job" to "It has to be The Best.".
Cdr Salamander has spilled quite a few pixels on Zumwalt and Destroyers in general.
Besides being ridiculously expensive, which wouldn’t be so bad, if you only needed three “destroyers.” The Zumwalt’s complete lack of anti-ship missiles, anti-submarine torpedoes and long-range area-air defense missiles should make you wonder. What is this ship going to do?
The final straw is the removal of the advanced gun system. We were finally going to have meaningful shore bombardment capabilities again. Something we lost when we mothballed the Iowa class ships.
We will far better off with three or four Burke class Block 3 Destroyers for the price of one Zumwalt.
And lastly! Don’t waste anymore money on Zumwalts. And get out there and replace the Ticonderoga class cruisers, that have long since passed their freshness date.
Ok first the Zumwalt was fitted with 155 mm AGS, but it wasn't a rail gun. It's a semi projectile. With a large powder charge and a rocket assisted projectile (RAP)
Second as far a public records show, the ship isn't 901 shock qualified. No full ship shock trials that I have been able to find. Meaning it is less survivable for it's crew than the LCS (both flavors)
The ship class is a mess. It's been misshandled from the start and wouldn't exist without direct intervention of pork barrel politics.
I'd be willing to take my chances with the damage control strategy in the Zumwalt design. Let's go get that shock trial scheduled.
The Navy’s force generation concpet yields roughly 1/3 of the force forward deployed, 1/3 getting ready to deploy, and 1/3 in post-deployment refit. So basically this investment will yield one forward deployed DDG-1000?
The Zumwalt class may be stealthy, but they still make noise. Those ships may need SSNs to protect them. If I was China and wanted to start something, I would be continuously tracking these ships before hand and have an SSN tracking each one. If they have the SSNs when they need them. And if the subs and crews are any good.
We spent a huge amount on designing and building the LCS and Zumwalt classes. And completed both, so far, are near useless in a fight. Now we have a frigate that's being built and designed at the same time. Probably another failure. The cost now is close to a destroyer. We'd be better off if the money was spent on more destroyers and maybe the cruisers. I guess we're lucky they're not still building battleships.
The system we have for picking senior officers has been failing America fro decades.
From where I sit we have yes men serving admirals that are yes men to senior admirals who were yes men in their time. The fighting officers that get things done don't seem to make higher ranks. At this point I think we need to take some of the decisions on new designs away from the current admirals.
Not that I think politicians would be any better.
I'm on the fence with a lot of this. I'm certainly hesitant to invest another dime in $7B ships that have questionable capabilities. Expending tens(hundreds?) of millions more to carry a small amount of hypersonics that are of debatable utility is tough for me to agree to. Taking a refit even further and completely replacing sensors and combat systems?? Even tougher. I'm not sure I see the CONOP spelled out clearly enough, and convincingly enough as well, to warrant the massive costs. Idk if they're envisioned as a squadron, operating alone or (??). If upgraded to Aegis/Spy6, then they could potentially protect themselves at least, but to what end? How much true impact would those hypersonic have- even if we were talking about all three ships together.
In my mind, the Zumwalts biggest strength is the power generation. Use them as test beds and places to deploy the directed energy weapons. Spend the money on getting those weapons to a production level ASAP. The Brits seem to be ahead of us on this, so buy their tech if needed. The Zumwalts could become the Atlanta-class of the 21st century. Sure, being BG escorts is far from what anyone envisioned, but they could become potent as the directed energy AAW cruiser of the future...
And frankly, I'm not fully sold on stealth-ifying ships. Sure they're harder to see from other surface ships. But the real threat of detection comes from the air. And at 30000ft, from 30+ miles away, guess what has big slab sides facing right at the aircraft?? Of course anything that flies at that range, probably dies but...
Agreed, in the modern era the only stealth ships are called subs. Major surface groups are going to have satellite surveillance almost continuously. It would be stupid go to emissions control to be "stealthy" while a bloody satellite is looking. Best bet is have your radars going full bast so you can at least detect something coming at you
To be fair, full, real time surveillance of the oceans is something nobody has. I read a paper recently about this, and paraphrasing and using round numbers, it'd take something like 22000 satellites to cover the entire SCS!! Never mind the Phillipine Sea and western Pacific, where the CVBGs would be operating as they try to push west. So, ships and groups still CAN hide in the vastness. Of course once you begin offensive operations, your general location becomes known. At that point, stealth becomes more about avoiding missile locks as long as possible, and less about being invisible. So whether extreme stealth shaping is worthwhile or not probably can't be truly quantified until after all the blue missiles have been taken off the rails...
Sure...but I'd temper that with the fact that the shipyards and builders make the same profit margin on good, properly designed ships, that they do on worthless, pointless designs. So lets put them to work building stuff that's actually combat capable and useful...
Bryan, As usual good analysis. I also lived through the DDX-DD21-DDG1000 Saga as a resource sponsor on the Navy Staff. The truncation from 31 to 3 was a combination of the mission changing, the Navy's flawed acquisition approach, and in my view the ineffective medaling of the DoD acquisition oversight process. That coupled with SECNAV and ASN RDA arbitrary decisions on the ship design which did not help and the total ship computing environment (TSCE) which I lived through as N766 made the ship an albatross. That said, there were some very important cutting edge technologies that as they mature will be essential in future surface combatant decisions. First a couple of minor corrections. The Advanced Gun System was not actually rail gun. It was designed to fire rocket assisted projectiles that became prohibitively expensive and made worse by the class truncation. It also was fitted with MK 57 Vertical launch cells vs. MK 41. The Combat System decision was also a detractor. The decision to drop the dual band X/S band radar, driven by challenges in the signal processor decision neutralized the IAMD capability. The S Band arrays that LM designed and built were never installed. The X Band SPY3 did not have the volume search needs for true area air defense. There was a discussion with PEO-IWS to potentially replace the combat system with Aegis BL9 for the third ship which I don't believe was acted on. The contractors Raytheon and LM were not that helpful either. All said, we are where we are. These ships continue to provide great service in refining integrated electric drive and electrical systems for combat systems. support. With the USN decision to single up on surface ship combat systems via the Aegis program makes replacing the currently installed systems a great idea. The fielding of SPY6 is also an important improvement as you point out. Solid State S Band radar is essential for radar resources and capabilities as we continue to deal with ever more complicated ballistic missiles and the advent of hypersonic threats. Long range strike is also essential. These ships have aviation facilities that have huge potential as well. As for cost per hull, the cost growth was a combination of many of the acquisition factors I mentioned, but mostly the truncation to 3 ships that are to blame. These ships will play an important role as the USN moves to the next generation surface combatants. Finally, one pet peeve, it is not and never been a Destroyer. Need to update its designation based on where the mission set falls. Fix that please. As always great thoughts and analysis.
As always, I appreciate the wisdom of a mentor.
I think the reason to push ahead with ZEUS would be enhanced if the Navy just decided that DDGX would be Zumwalt Fllt II. We could hedge bets and get more bang for the buck with a cheaper Flt IV Burke and a high end, Zumwalt based, cruiser. We need to get started on this now so we stop eating our numbers with more Flt IIIs than we need and all this talk about a second frigate yard. I'll hold off on the details and leave it at this.
I think we should be honest about the Burkes. They are focused on AAW. I'd suggest that IF the DDGX is going to fill the Tico/Burke slot, then delete the ASW equipment and helo facilities. That would potentially shrink the ship and make it cheaper. Yay. Add 4-5 CIWS/RAM for survivability and call it a day. I dint think risking a $2B Aegis ship for ASW is a smart choice.
Continuing along those lines, I'd bring the Connie's to an end right now, and start over with a strictly ASW focus. Hull and towed sonar with 3 helo capacity, and nothing else except CIWS/RAM.
Now if we want a high end Aegis AAW cruiser, then maybe the Zumwalt is the place to start- maybe not. But again, make it a focused, not multirole platform. If it's still needed, make sure there's room for the AAW commander. And go with the largest radar panels. Utilize the power production the ships are capable of. But I wonder if integrating the illuminator and such would be possible without losing the stealthiness(???). I think having an AAW ship that's stealthy is wise, but is it possible? Maybe we have to settle for a more conventional superstructure on a Zumwalt hull. Or maybe we only use the powerplant and scrap the rest of the Zum design (??). So many questions...!!!
AEGIS
Had to go a Wikking about the system. Ye Gads!!!
First test 1997. Repeated tests with success then failure until the last test listed was in March 2024.
Question: Is any other country rich enough to spend this amount of time and money to develop such a system. Has any other country demonstrated a similar system? The Chinese?
Neither more nor faster alas
30 years!!!
How in the hell does a service be able to look forward 30 years and correctly predict the threat environment!!!!!!!
They make knowledgeable guesses and at least half will be wrong.
Ideally ship and sub platform designers and resource sponsors would mimic what Naval Aviation has done with F/A-18, having a (somewhat) open architecture for sensors, weapons and comms; and the physical/data/electrical/cooling interfaces to enable timely updates within an integrated environment.
I have serious doubts that even on the current plan that there will be one destroyer ready to deploy with an operational CPS in the next three years. AGS wasn't ready for prime time, rail guns still aren't, and I'd wager the technical challenges you cite in integrating CPS will create a similar outcome. The mods you suggest could take another significant chunk of time and by then the hulls (even with little to no use on them) will be getting long in the tooth. Moreover, I question the assumptions driving urgency to put CPS on surface ships at all, but that's another argument.
Agree about time left for these hulls. Look at all the lost time since they were commissioned. At least with Ford it’s lost deployment time is amortized over a fifty year life. Keep piling up the waste: Sprus, LCS, DDG-1000.
Is TSCEi an outgrowth of "Workstation Architecture" or a replacement thereof??
I only ask since I know the guy who led the Workstation Architecture project for Ratheon.
I was the design integration manager for Ingalls. To the best of my memory, TSCE became the official name of the workstation architecture concept. I do remember briefing slides from fairly early on that used a graphic in which TSCE was the over-arching means for data flow. I will also admit that my job was to make sure all of the toys fit on the toy box, so I was not heavily invested in the finer points of data bytes.
Believe many pieces of TSCEi have gone obsolete from the OEMs. There are also other “vulnerabilities” with TSCEi in this day/age/environment. As with the ships of that late 90’s/early 00’s design , CANES and other installs are necessary and underway to replace the CFE designed TSCEi and SWAN across all those ships.
With the pace of that area of technology, I can easily see that to be the case. Thanks for you thoughts. Along those general lines of thought.... all of our ships need to be resilient. We need backups for our backups, as it were. I'm hoping that the current generation of electronic architects keep that in mind.
That I do not know.
You forgot to mention that the shells for the 110 km range main guns would cost $800,000 each to deliver 11 kg of explosive. Severe stupidity that the project got that far. It is still doing stupid. $40 million per shot for conventional prompt strike. A self-defeating weapon because it is too expensive for the effect. The weapon the Zumwalts should be armed with is PrSM increment 2. $2 million for a 600 km range and a 90 kg warhead. Ideal for plunging straight down into the vertical launch cells of Chicom destroyers. Stop the stupidity.
For Zumwalt, yes. For Naval Gunfire support I want quad packed ER-GMLRS on very small, cheap ships. FSVs with ADL launchers on the deck. Low manning with range and firepower.
I don't think one can blame LCS's failure on the "changing security environment". The culprits were:
1. Non-sensical, conflicting requirements,
2. Unwarranted faith in low TRL enabling technologies and;
3. Incompetent program management.
Ironically, the Navy has been engaged in littoral combat against a non-state actor in the Red Sea for the last 18 months and has yet to deploy a single LCS. This is literally the threat and mission it was (poorly designed) to accomplish.
It also appears that the Navy has screwed up the FFG-62. A program that should have been a 'slam dunk' (minor modification of an existing foreign design) is now anticipating a 40% cost increase and 3 year delay.
Before laying down grand plans to modify the Zumwalts into a battlecruiser we should take a clear-eyed look at the Navy's track record in shipbuilding over the last 20 years. l have near zero confidence in N96 or NAVSEA to do anything more complicated than oversee the contracting and construction of more Arleigh Burkes.
I think you hit on a key enabler. They should have their designation changed to light cruiser, guided missile, CLG. Make it clear their importance.
Concur. 15,000 tons qualifies. Major weapon system qualifies. Now, develop the TTPs. Otherwise, all of the effort will be wasted.
Not sure I blamed "LCS'S failure" on the security environment. I certainly asserted the fleet architecture into which it fit was a failure. But as the only platform that survived semi-unmolested, I don't think I'd make such a direct statement
LCS are being decommissioned with six years of service life. They are fragile, overpriced and undergunned. The entire ASW module was cancelled leaving the class completely useless against an enemy with submarines (read China, Russia, Iran, North Korea). I could go on - but think you get the point.
Your Zumwalt concept would require a Navy with Division 1 level discipline and ship design skills. What we've seen from NAVSEA over the last 20 years is a drunken, poorly run Junior Varsity team.
Lots of blame to go around
- Congress tweaking requirements
- Being forced o have privatized design
- Lack of Conops to go with KPIs and other requirements which often lack basic detail.
Now I'm AF (we're the smart one. Send the offices out to fight. :-)) so what do I know. Why not take an older class dd pack it full of the latest technology, build a bunch and send them out? Point being Why does it Have To Be The Newest?
DDG51 class is weight(Kg)/space/power/cooling limited. The HM&E are all tapped out with Flight III. DDG-1000 has a lot of capacity in all the above.
WRT to CPS, the Surface version is (as the Navy tells us) "risk reduction" for the submarine version. Putting it on a ship that is decidedly difficult to locate and track seemed sensible (to me at least).
It seems to me there is a problem in the DOD when it comes to weapons procurement.. Maybe (just MAYBE) its we have gone from "It's good enough, it'll do the job" to "It has to be The Best.".
More like "It has to be absolutely perfect and do everything at once".
Sadly.