On the Sinking of the Moskva

The Russian Navy ship MOSKVA listing to port, soon to sink.

Some readers know I spent a few years in the U.S. Navy. During that time (21 years), I was a Surface Warfare Officer, which means I spent my operational time in ships (as opposed to submarines or flying). My final sea tour (2004-6) was as Commanding Officer of the USS BULKELEY (DDG 84), two incomparable years for which I will always be grateful to this country.

When I started my association with the Navy in the late summer of 1983, we were in the teeth of the Cold War, though no one had a clue it would end with the decade. Starting with NROTC at UVA and then continuing on into my career (commissioned May 1987) the Soviet Navy was our obsession, and the SLAVA was the symbol of their power and might. No ship in their inventory was as powerful or as fearsome, and we truly believed the Soviets had a first rate Navy full of first rate ships, aircraft, and missiles.

That ship, the SLAVA (renamed MOSKVA)—is pictured above, heavily listing to port after hits from two Ukrainian surface to surface missiles last week. Although we have no definitive word from the Russians, it is a good bet that 80-90 percent of the crew of nearly 500 was lost in the fire, flooding, and sinking of the ship.

It has been a long time since a ship of this size has been struck and sunk in battle, and the American public has grown unfamiliar with the savagery of war at sea. One of the purposes of this essay is to urge my fellow citizens to shake themselves free of this unfamiliarity, as every bone in my body tells me we are headed for a new era of conflict at sea. For the moment though, let us look at how what was once the most powerful ship in the Soviet Navy was sent to the bottom.

The Russians Did Not Respect The Threat

Much of the world is flowing weapons into Ukraine these days, including shore based anti-ship missiles. Additionally, Ukraine has some of their own, two of which are reportedly the rounds that schwacked MOSKVA. One way to respect the coastal missile threat is to know what it is and then to stay outside its likely operational range. This was not the case here, nor have Russian ships been particularly shy about operating close to shore. If a ship IS to operate within the “weapons envelope”, it requires several things. The first is for its systems and crew to be well-trained and competent to operate their combat system. But even if this were the case, the nature of surface to surface missiles flying fast and close to the earth’s surface makes them challenging targets to detect and neutralize. Without prior warning, the ship would likely have about 90 seconds to detect, evaluate, and engage before the missiles would impact, so the key here is to have prior warning. The most effective prior warning in a situation such as this is some kind of airborne platform with radar and infrared sensors that can detect the missile launch and track them throughout their flight, offering the ship several opportunities to shoot them down with its own missiles, guns, and close in defense systems. I have seen or heard of no unclassified reporting of such overhead sensor support. If she wasn’t “alone and unafraid”, she was damn close to it.

The Ship Was Old and Had Not Kept Up

I opened this piece reminiscing about how fearsome SLAVA was to us….in 1983. That was a long, long time ago, and in the interim, the Soviet Union fell, the Soviet Navy disappeared, Russia rebuilt, and Russia worked to get its Navy back up to snuff. There are some areas where they have succeeded (attack submarines appear to be one), but the plain truth of the matter is that MOSKVA was old and was operating systems that were past their prime. I cannot even begin to tell you how much money the US Navy has spent on updating and modernizing its ships, some of which were also active in the 1980’s.

The Russian Navy is About As Competent as the Russian Army

When discussing respect for the threat, I mentioned well-trained crews. I’m not an expert in land warfare, but most of the experts I know of seem to be somewhat disappointed in the basic competence of the Russian Army. While they may still win this war, their reputation as a fighting force has taken a huge hit. When the flagship of the Black Sea fleet gets taken out, basic questions of competence at sea must be asked. Again, respecting the threat is a sign of competence, and thus far, it seems lacking in the Russian operational culture.

The Ship Was Built to Destroy or Be Destroyed, Not Survive

Let’s have another look at MOSKVA, shall we:

I will never forget as a young Midshipman/Junior Officer how cool I thought those SS-N-12 missile launchers looked astride the forward deckhouse of the ship. There are eight on each side, each with a 1000KG warhead and thousands of gallons of jet fuel. Absolute killers, they were. The Soviets built ships that just LOOKED powerful, and they inspired awe in those of us who beheld them. Let’s contrast that muscular deck profile with a picture of a modern US warship. We’ll use…..well, why not. Let’s use my old ship, USS BULKELEY (DDG 84).

That’s a picture of the fo’c’sle of BULKELEY. Lotta empty space up there. There’s a five inch gun, which is a nice piece of gear, but it isn’t gonna take out a proper warship unless you pretty much come along side and dump rounds into it. No, the real firepower is just aft of the gun mount where you see that honey-combed bunch of doors on the deck. That is a vertical launching system (VLS) and inside of it are missiles. In the case of that forward launcher, there are 32 total cells. There’s another one like it aft with 64 cells. You can shoot missiles at ships, at airplanes, and at land targets from that launcher. It really doesn’t inspire fear or awe, does it. Well, it’s not supposed to. It is supposed to be able to fire a number of different kinds of rounds from a launcher that has an installed deluge system in it to protect the ship from an explosion of one or more missiles in the launcher.

Look back up at MOSKVA again. Sixteen thousand kilograms of high explosive wrapped around the superstructure without an installed firefighting system. One of my good friends and trusted mentors from Navy days referred to it as a “Hezbollah suicide belt”. And a suicide belt it is. You see, MOSKVA wasn’t built to take a punch, just deliver them. And she had a glass jaw.

What are the Implications of MOSKVA Sinking?

The first implication is that the Russian Navy is likely to be a hell of a lot more careful in the Black Sea for the remainder of this conflict, as the Ukrainians are getting more missiles and one has to conclude, targeting data from friendly and supportive nations.

The second implication is that like tanks and armored vehicles, there is all manner of speculation that the day of the ship has passed. Poppycock. The day of operating ships poorly and haphazardly has passed, just as operating tanks and armored vehicles haphazardly has passed. The key in both situations is control of the air, and it seems clear that the Russians have not been able to attain that over land or sea.

The third and most important implication for my American readers is that we—Americans—need to understand that if we go to war with China, we are going to lose ships and we are going to lose crews. The losses could be staggering. Do I think we might find that the Chinese have similar operational flaws to what we are seeing with the Russians? Yes. Do I think they will still be wicked opponents? Yep. The key to “winning” the war with the Chinese is to always have enough power forward to convince them not to start it. This is unfortunately, not the path that this administration is choosing for its security and defense strategies, and the continuing decline of our forward deployed naval power as a function of what China can deploy in its own near abroad makes it increasingly likely that China WILL decide to start things, although just what those things are remains debatable.

It is time to become a serious nation once again, and a serious Navy is a good place to start.