Some readers know I spent a few years in the U.S. Navy. During that time (21 years), I was a Surface Warfare Officer, which means I spent my operational time in ships (as opposed to submarines or flying). My final sea tour (2004-6) was as Commanding Officer of the
Why not invert the perception? The Chicom bases in the Spratleys are in a natural born killbox. Chicom aircraft from Hainan have 1,000 km to fly to get there - a few minutes on station and then they have to turn around and dodge missiles all the way back to base (assuming that the three airfields are made unserviceable. Not matter what else they try, the Chicoms will spend an inordinate amount of effort trying to protect those bases. And to unsettle them, announce which countries get which bases when the Chicom war of choice is over. My suggestion is:
The big difference this time is that the US has possession of or access to all the islands in the western Pacific. They are the unsinkable carriers. Just patch the concrete and the airfield is good to go again in three hours. Brush up on making airfields from crushed coral rock - just spray it with seawater and it will solidify in a few days. The Chicom DF-21s are $20 million a pop and it takes a week to reload. Ukraine has absorbed a lot of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Just sink the Chicom ships and they can't go anywhere.
A lot of good points. I was on the JFK the Forrestal and the Coral Sea. The defense mechanisms are critical. I then worried about China too but as long as we are their primary consumer of goods I think they will be reluctant to destroy our infrastructure.
Ps... Most administrations are reluctant to go all in on the military. Thanks for the birds eye view, and for your service. Go Navy !
You had me totally onboard - until that last cheap shot on this administration. Totally unnecessary Brian. The question it begs, is what is the GOP plan, other than shitting on and obstructing any plan others have. Dying to see a GOP plank/platform.
ASBMs are only relevant if the Find and Fix capability exists for it. There are many ways to deny the OTHR targeting capability which effectively neutralizes the Chinese long-range threat.
While largely I think this is correct, I think the section on China is over-focused on the threat posed by Chinese naval vessels. The USN is very much going to be choosing between being close enough to the Chinese littoral to do, well, anything relevant, and being out of range of Chinese shore-launched anti-ship ballistic missiles. And all signs point to the current generation of Chinese ASBMs being A) very lethal, B) very long ranged, and C) very, very hard, approaching impossible, to intercept. The known presence and suspected efficacy of those ASBMs is going to make operating in the South China Sea a daring move for the USN in a shooting war, even before the PLAN comes into play.
Damn, the SecNav should begin his testimony with just this line. "It is time to become a serious nation once again, and a serious Navy is a good place to start."
This is the kind of analysis I subscribe for. While I’d suspected the Russian Navy was old, poorly-maintained, and poorly run, I knew none of the details. This was very interesting.
“ One way to respect the coastal missile threat is to know what it is and then to stay outside its likely operational range.”
I suppose this applies even more to China’s coastline.
“ Look back up at MOSKVA again. Sixteen thousand kilograms of high explosive wrapped around the superstructure without an installed firefighting system. One of my good friends and trusted mentors from Navy days referred to it as a “Hezbollah suicide belt”. And a suicide belt it is. You see, MOSKVA wasn’t built to take a punch, just deliver them. And she had a glass jaw.”
Mr. McGrath, what do you think of the idea of the US building a lot of autonomous ships designed actually to be a little bit like this description of the MOSKVA. Some have floated the idea of floating missile siloes (I’m not sure that’s the phrase they’d use), operated by sailors who stay out of range of the A2AD range. Since they don’t carry humans, they could be more expendable and could pack a punch. At the same time, I can see some flaws with the idea of drone ships. I’d appreciate your thoughts on the matter.
“ The second implication is that like tanks and armored vehicles, there is all manner of speculation that the day of the ship has passed. Poppycock. The day of operating ships poorly and haphazardly has passed, just as operating tanks and armored vehicles haphazardly has passed. The key in both situations is control of the air, and it seems clear that the Russians have not been able to attain that over land or sea.”
Lots of people who have no familiarity with Navy operations make similar poppycock assumptions all the time. It’s bogus but not surprising.
“ The key to “winning” the war with the Chinese is to always have enough power forward to convince them not to start it. This is unfortunately, not the path that this administration is choosing for its security and defense strategies, and the continuing decline of our forward deployed naval power as a function of what China can deploy in its own near abroad makes it increasingly likely that China WILL decide to start things, although just what those things are remains debatable.”
I’m in total agreement. How many ships do you think we realistically need to make this a reality? I’m pretty sure I’ve seen you quoted somewhere many times on this exact subject, but off the top of my head I don’t remember.
“ It is time to become a serious nation once again, and a serious Navy is a good place to start.”
I agree. There was a guest piece in Bari Weiss’s Substack (which I have mixed feelings about as a blog) arguing that America needs to become serious again. I’ve long thought that, although I struggle sometimes to be a serious person. It was a good piece. Did you read it?
From ‘87 to ‘90 I taught the Soviet threat at Department Head school. Then there was no Chinese threat to speak about. A couple very noisy subs. That is not the case today. To quote “Winter is coming.”
Why not invert the perception? The Chicom bases in the Spratleys are in a natural born killbox. Chicom aircraft from Hainan have 1,000 km to fly to get there - a few minutes on station and then they have to turn around and dodge missiles all the way back to base (assuming that the three airfields are made unserviceable. Not matter what else they try, the Chicoms will spend an inordinate amount of effort trying to protect those bases. And to unsettle them, announce which countries get which bases when the Chicom war of choice is over. My suggestion is:
Vietnam Fiery Cross Reef
Cuateron Reef
Japan Subi Reef
Gaven Reef
US Mischief Reef
Hughes Reef
Johnson South Reef
The big difference this time is that the US has possession of or access to all the islands in the western Pacific. They are the unsinkable carriers. Just patch the concrete and the airfield is good to go again in three hours. Brush up on making airfields from crushed coral rock - just spray it with seawater and it will solidify in a few days. The Chicom DF-21s are $20 million a pop and it takes a week to reload. Ukraine has absorbed a lot of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Just sink the Chicom ships and they can't go anywhere.
A lot of good points. I was on the JFK the Forrestal and the Coral Sea. The defense mechanisms are critical. I then worried about China too but as long as we are their primary consumer of goods I think they will be reluctant to destroy our infrastructure.
Ps... Most administrations are reluctant to go all in on the military. Thanks for the birds eye view, and for your service. Go Navy !
You had me totally onboard - until that last cheap shot on this administration. Totally unnecessary Brian. The question it begs, is what is the GOP plan, other than shitting on and obstructing any plan others have. Dying to see a GOP plank/platform.
ASBMs are only relevant if the Find and Fix capability exists for it. There are many ways to deny the OTHR targeting capability which effectively neutralizes the Chinese long-range threat.
While largely I think this is correct, I think the section on China is over-focused on the threat posed by Chinese naval vessels. The USN is very much going to be choosing between being close enough to the Chinese littoral to do, well, anything relevant, and being out of range of Chinese shore-launched anti-ship ballistic missiles. And all signs point to the current generation of Chinese ASBMs being A) very lethal, B) very long ranged, and C) very, very hard, approaching impossible, to intercept. The known presence and suspected efficacy of those ASBMs is going to make operating in the South China Sea a daring move for the USN in a shooting war, even before the PLAN comes into play.
Fine piece. Thank you.
Damn, the SecNav should begin his testimony with just this line. "It is time to become a serious nation once again, and a serious Navy is a good place to start."
This is the kind of analysis I subscribe for. While I’d suspected the Russian Navy was old, poorly-maintained, and poorly run, I knew none of the details. This was very interesting.
“ One way to respect the coastal missile threat is to know what it is and then to stay outside its likely operational range.”
I suppose this applies even more to China’s coastline.
“ Look back up at MOSKVA again. Sixteen thousand kilograms of high explosive wrapped around the superstructure without an installed firefighting system. One of my good friends and trusted mentors from Navy days referred to it as a “Hezbollah suicide belt”. And a suicide belt it is. You see, MOSKVA wasn’t built to take a punch, just deliver them. And she had a glass jaw.”
Mr. McGrath, what do you think of the idea of the US building a lot of autonomous ships designed actually to be a little bit like this description of the MOSKVA. Some have floated the idea of floating missile siloes (I’m not sure that’s the phrase they’d use), operated by sailors who stay out of range of the A2AD range. Since they don’t carry humans, they could be more expendable and could pack a punch. At the same time, I can see some flaws with the idea of drone ships. I’d appreciate your thoughts on the matter.
“ The second implication is that like tanks and armored vehicles, there is all manner of speculation that the day of the ship has passed. Poppycock. The day of operating ships poorly and haphazardly has passed, just as operating tanks and armored vehicles haphazardly has passed. The key in both situations is control of the air, and it seems clear that the Russians have not been able to attain that over land or sea.”
Lots of people who have no familiarity with Navy operations make similar poppycock assumptions all the time. It’s bogus but not surprising.
“ The key to “winning” the war with the Chinese is to always have enough power forward to convince them not to start it. This is unfortunately, not the path that this administration is choosing for its security and defense strategies, and the continuing decline of our forward deployed naval power as a function of what China can deploy in its own near abroad makes it increasingly likely that China WILL decide to start things, although just what those things are remains debatable.”
I’m in total agreement. How many ships do you think we realistically need to make this a reality? I’m pretty sure I’ve seen you quoted somewhere many times on this exact subject, but off the top of my head I don’t remember.
“ It is time to become a serious nation once again, and a serious Navy is a good place to start.”
I agree. There was a guest piece in Bari Weiss’s Substack (which I have mixed feelings about as a blog) arguing that America needs to become serious again. I’ve long thought that, although I struggle sometimes to be a serious person. It was a good piece. Did you read it?
From ‘87 to ‘90 I taught the Soviet threat at Department Head school. Then there was no Chinese threat to speak about. A couple very noisy subs. That is not the case today. To quote “Winter is coming.”
Alfred Thayer Mahan would agree…