A lot of good points. I was on the JFK the Forrestal and the Coral Sea. The defense mechanisms are critical. I then worried about China too but as long as we are their primary consumer of goods I think they will be reluctant to destroy our infrastructure.
Ps... Most administrations are reluctant to go all in on the military. Thanks for the birds eye view, and for your service. Go Navy !
You had me totally onboard - until that last cheap shot on this administration. Totally unnecessary Brian. The question it begs, is what is the GOP plan, other than shitting on and obstructing any plan others have. Dying to see a GOP plank/platform.
ASBMs are only relevant if the Find and Fix capability exists for it. There are many ways to deny the OTHR targeting capability which effectively neutralizes the Chinese long-range threat.
While largely I think this is correct, I think the section on China is over-focused on the threat posed by Chinese naval vessels. The USN is very much going to be choosing between being close enough to the Chinese littoral to do, well, anything relevant, and being out of range of Chinese shore-launched anti-ship ballistic missiles. And all signs point to the current generation of Chinese ASBMs being A) very lethal, B) very long ranged, and C) very, very hard, approaching impossible, to intercept. The known presence and suspected efficacy of those ASBMs is going to make operating in the South China Sea a daring move for the USN in a shooting war, even before the PLAN comes into play.
Damn, the SecNav should begin his testimony with just this line. "It is time to become a serious nation once again, and a serious Navy is a good place to start."
This is the kind of analysis I subscribe for. While I’d suspected the Russian Navy was old, poorly-maintained, and poorly run, I knew none of the details. This was very interesting.
“ One way to respect the coastal missile threat is to know what it is and then to stay outside its likely operational range.”
I suppose this applies even more to China’s coastline.
“ Look back up at MOSKVA again. Sixteen thousand kilograms of high explosive wrapped around the superstructure without an installed firefighting system. One of my good friends and trusted mentors from Navy days referred to it as a “Hezbollah suicide belt”. And a suicide belt it is. You see, MOSKVA wasn’t built to take a punch, just deliver them. And she had a glass jaw.”
Mr. McGrath, what do you think of the idea of the US building a lot of autonomous ships designed actually to be a little bit like this description of the MOSKVA. Some have floated the idea of floating missile siloes (I’m not sure that’s the phrase they’d use), operated by sailors who stay out of range of the A2AD range. Since they don’t carry humans, they could be more expendable and could pack a punch. At the same time, I can see some flaws with the idea of drone ships. I’d appreciate your thoughts on the matter.
“ The second implication is that like tanks and armored vehicles, there is all manner of speculation that the day of the ship has passed. Poppycock. The day of operating ships poorly and haphazardly has passed, just as operating tanks and armored vehicles haphazardly has passed. The key in both situations is control of the air, and it seems clear that the Russians have not been able to attain that over land or sea.”
Lots of people who have no familiarity with Navy operations make similar poppycock assumptions all the time. It’s bogus but not surprising.
“ The key to “winning” the war with the Chinese is to always have enough power forward to convince them not to start it. This is unfortunately, not the path that this administration is choosing for its security and defense strategies, and the continuing decline of our forward deployed naval power as a function of what China can deploy in its own near abroad makes it increasingly likely that China WILL decide to start things, although just what those things are remains debatable.”
I’m in total agreement. How many ships do you think we realistically need to make this a reality? I’m pretty sure I’ve seen you quoted somewhere many times on this exact subject, but off the top of my head I don’t remember.
“ It is time to become a serious nation once again, and a serious Navy is a good place to start.”
I agree. There was a guest piece in Bari Weiss’s Substack (which I have mixed feelings about as a blog) arguing that America needs to become serious again. I’ve long thought that, although I struggle sometimes to be a serious person. It was a good piece. Did you read it?
A number of autonomous ships acting as adjunct missile magazines is a-ok with me, but there are some technical challenges to overcome. Not cold fusion, but a bit more work required.
We need enough ships and enough subs and enough ISR to ensure that every single Chinese Navy ship over say, 50 Meters, that leaves homeport is tracked and has missiles assigned. Not quite sure what that number is, and if I knew it, wouldn't prolly say it here.
From ‘87 to ‘90 I taught the Soviet threat at Department Head school. Then there was no Chinese threat to speak about. A couple very noisy subs. That is not the case today. To quote “Winter is coming.”
Was an RD-0334 back in 1966-67...a sometimes AN/BLR-1 or AN/WLR-1 operator. There was never a full time EW watch kept. I recall well the sinking of INS Eilat in 1967. What a huge wake-up call that was. Got caught up in it myself and was force converted from RD to EW. But there is always a snooze after a wake-up. You're either at the top of your game or at the bottom of the ocean, I think. '87 to '89 I was DIVO for EW"A" School. We graduated no slackers, despite the screams about our attrition rate.
A lot of good points. I was on the JFK the Forrestal and the Coral Sea. The defense mechanisms are critical. I then worried about China too but as long as we are their primary consumer of goods I think they will be reluctant to destroy our infrastructure.
Ps... Most administrations are reluctant to go all in on the military. Thanks for the birds eye view, and for your service. Go Navy !
You had me totally onboard - until that last cheap shot on this administration. Totally unnecessary Brian. The question it begs, is what is the GOP plan, other than shitting on and obstructing any plan others have. Dying to see a GOP plank/platform.
Myke, I stopped giving a shit about what you thought a long time ago.
ASBMs are only relevant if the Find and Fix capability exists for it. There are many ways to deny the OTHR targeting capability which effectively neutralizes the Chinese long-range threat.
While largely I think this is correct, I think the section on China is over-focused on the threat posed by Chinese naval vessels. The USN is very much going to be choosing between being close enough to the Chinese littoral to do, well, anything relevant, and being out of range of Chinese shore-launched anti-ship ballistic missiles. And all signs point to the current generation of Chinese ASBMs being A) very lethal, B) very long ranged, and C) very, very hard, approaching impossible, to intercept. The known presence and suspected efficacy of those ASBMs is going to make operating in the South China Sea a daring move for the USN in a shooting war, even before the PLAN comes into play.
Fine piece. Thank you.
Damn, the SecNav should begin his testimony with just this line. "It is time to become a serious nation once again, and a serious Navy is a good place to start."
This is the kind of analysis I subscribe for. While I’d suspected the Russian Navy was old, poorly-maintained, and poorly run, I knew none of the details. This was very interesting.
“ One way to respect the coastal missile threat is to know what it is and then to stay outside its likely operational range.”
I suppose this applies even more to China’s coastline.
“ Look back up at MOSKVA again. Sixteen thousand kilograms of high explosive wrapped around the superstructure without an installed firefighting system. One of my good friends and trusted mentors from Navy days referred to it as a “Hezbollah suicide belt”. And a suicide belt it is. You see, MOSKVA wasn’t built to take a punch, just deliver them. And she had a glass jaw.”
Mr. McGrath, what do you think of the idea of the US building a lot of autonomous ships designed actually to be a little bit like this description of the MOSKVA. Some have floated the idea of floating missile siloes (I’m not sure that’s the phrase they’d use), operated by sailors who stay out of range of the A2AD range. Since they don’t carry humans, they could be more expendable and could pack a punch. At the same time, I can see some flaws with the idea of drone ships. I’d appreciate your thoughts on the matter.
“ The second implication is that like tanks and armored vehicles, there is all manner of speculation that the day of the ship has passed. Poppycock. The day of operating ships poorly and haphazardly has passed, just as operating tanks and armored vehicles haphazardly has passed. The key in both situations is control of the air, and it seems clear that the Russians have not been able to attain that over land or sea.”
Lots of people who have no familiarity with Navy operations make similar poppycock assumptions all the time. It’s bogus but not surprising.
“ The key to “winning” the war with the Chinese is to always have enough power forward to convince them not to start it. This is unfortunately, not the path that this administration is choosing for its security and defense strategies, and the continuing decline of our forward deployed naval power as a function of what China can deploy in its own near abroad makes it increasingly likely that China WILL decide to start things, although just what those things are remains debatable.”
I’m in total agreement. How many ships do you think we realistically need to make this a reality? I’m pretty sure I’ve seen you quoted somewhere many times on this exact subject, but off the top of my head I don’t remember.
“ It is time to become a serious nation once again, and a serious Navy is a good place to start.”
I agree. There was a guest piece in Bari Weiss’s Substack (which I have mixed feelings about as a blog) arguing that America needs to become serious again. I’ve long thought that, although I struggle sometimes to be a serious person. It was a good piece. Did you read it?
A number of autonomous ships acting as adjunct missile magazines is a-ok with me, but there are some technical challenges to overcome. Not cold fusion, but a bit more work required.
We need enough ships and enough subs and enough ISR to ensure that every single Chinese Navy ship over say, 50 Meters, that leaves homeport is tracked and has missiles assigned. Not quite sure what that number is, and if I knew it, wouldn't prolly say it here.
That makes sense. Thanks!
From ‘87 to ‘90 I taught the Soviet threat at Department Head school. Then there was no Chinese threat to speak about. A couple very noisy subs. That is not the case today. To quote “Winter is coming.”
Was an RD-0334 back in 1966-67...a sometimes AN/BLR-1 or AN/WLR-1 operator. There was never a full time EW watch kept. I recall well the sinking of INS Eilat in 1967. What a huge wake-up call that was. Got caught up in it myself and was force converted from RD to EW. But there is always a snooze after a wake-up. You're either at the top of your game or at the bottom of the ocean, I think. '87 to '89 I was DIVO for EW"A" School. We graduated no slackers, despite the screams about our attrition rate.
Alfred Thayer Mahan would agree…