Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023

Some thoughts from someone who cares

Note: My apologies to everyone who must suffer through getting TWO editions of my newsletter in their email today, but the Navy put out its “30 Year” shipbuilding plan last night and I have completed my review of it. I am using my Substack as the place to put this review, but if you are one of the folks who doesn’t love me writing about the Navy, don’t read any further. For those of you who appreciate this stuff, here goes. I assume everyone who goes on from here to have some experience with the subject, the acronyms, and the jargon.

The Navy has released its shipbuilding plan, and you can read it here. It is worth the time and effort, and I promise you that really serious people worked very hard to produce it. That I have criticisms of it does not detract from the hard work that has been done, and that work consists of very smart people with decades of experience in thinking about force structure and fleet architecture having to “satisfice” their political masters whose priorities do not include seapower. The plan that I discuss below reflects the tension between the Navy we need, and the Navy the administration wants to pay for. They are not the same thing.

Finally, it should be remembered that the Navy answers to civilian authority, in this case, the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To look at this plan and suggest that the Navy is getting it wrong is incorrect. The Navy is doing the best it can with the planning direction it is given and the strategy it must implement.

Plan Analysis

• Three separate profiles are considered, two of which assume no real budget growth, and the third of which appears to reflect the Navy’s actual desires/requirements. It is hard not to conclude that what transpired between the Navy and OSD was a conversation that went something like this.

Navy: “We need a larger Navy”.

OSD: “Have at it, as long as it doesn’t cost any more.”

Navy: “But that is impossible”.

OSD: “That’s not our problem. You need to support the President’s priorities”

Navy: “Well then, can we include an alternative under which we grow, but that we make very clear would require considerable additional investment? We’re a little tired of getting beaten up by Congress for telling them what we need and then not being able to budget for it.”

OSD: “Well, if you must. But no growth in this FYDP (remember, Divest to Invest!), and make the second FYDP look really expensive so Congress isn’t tempted to fully fund it.”

Navy: “Thanks Boss.”

• In both zero growth profiles, the mix of large surface combatants, attack submarines, and small surface combatants falls below 2 per year episodically. Alternative 1 tends to offer less pain to large combatants, alternative 2 less pain to SSN’s. For a document that spends a good bit of time talking about the industrial base, its planning profiles do not reflect the long-term commitment required to stabilize the industry (except alternative 3, which is—for this administration—the “throwaway COA”).

• The analytical basis for cannibalizing amphibious force structure to finance LAW remains paper thin, and precious little thought is being put to how to get more out of LPD’s rather than trading them in for LAW. On page 14, there is this passage: “Procures one LPD Flight II in FY2023 and completes procurement of the LPD Flight II line. The preponderance of full funding for LHA 9 is maintained in FY2023 and FY2024.The Navy will begin assessment of a next-generation amphibious ship (i.e., LPD(X)) in FY2023)”. It is irresponsible to end the LPD Flight II line when the work on what comes next has not even been done. Essentially the same goes for the big deck amphib plan. The LAW is not worthwhile if it costs amphibious force structure. It is only worthwhile if it is “in addition to”. I realize that the USMC is now very much dedicated to both, but there was a period in the first year or so of General Berger’s tenure where there was clear willingness to harvest larger amphibs for smaller. That die was cast.

• Additionally, calling LAW/counting LAW as an “Amphibious Warfare Ship” in the “Long Range Procurement Profiles” is a stretch. The platform ought more appropriately be counted among “Support Ships”.

• The degree to which this plan “backs off” from USV’s (unmanned surface vessels) is notable, with LUSV treated as “offering promise” and MUSV barely treated at all. This may be good, as the last administration pushed too hard and too fast without a good story—with Congress noticing. But progress is being made, and the role of unmanned in future naval war is undeniable.

• Recapitalizing the SSBN force is described thusly: “The once in a generation recapitalization of the Nation’s most survivable leg of the nuclear triad comes at the same time as the Navy modernizes for future threats, placing strain across the Navy’s budget”. Continuing to describe the SSBN acquisition in these terms is an attempt to relieve the administration from the consequences of having to recapitalize at the same time as we are facing renewed great power competition. Ramping up for something resembling a new Cold War strikes me as also “once in a generation”, if not century. We must do both, not shortchange one to accommodate the other.

• On page 7, an important paragraph: “CGs have been the Navy’s premier air defense command and control platforms for over three decades and this mission is now transitioning to Flight III DDGs. CGs on average are 35 years old and there would be little return on investment in maintaining these ships given their poor reliability, affordability, and lethality. The ships have a large vertical launch capacity; however, the substantial cost of repairing the poor material condition of these ships due to their age, and ongoing concerns with overall legacy sensor, and HM&E system reliability, outweighs the potential warfighting contributions of these platforms over their limited remaining service life.” Lots to unpack, but there is much truth here. When we designed the cruisers, we took an existing hull-form and engineering plant and placed two big aluminum deckhouses on the steel structure. Thirty-five years later, we are reaping the rewards (?) of having made this decision. Everyone wants to say that these ships haven’t been well-maintained, but we have run them hard and they are leaving service at their projected end of service life. Describing them as having poor lethality is just plain wrong, but then again, if you cannot reliably operate due to material condition, your lethality is somewhat irrelevant.

• To the extent that there is growth in the plan, it comes outside the current FYDP. In fact, the fleet shrinks from 297 to 280 in the current FYDP. Growing the Navy on the “next guy’s watch” is the last refuge of scoundrels (of either Party!) There are 51 ships procured in the FYDP, and in the “Transition” (second FYDP), alternative 1 procures 51, alternative 2 procures 50, and alternative 3 procures 68.

• On page 8, there is a graphic showing “Surface VLS Capacity”. Some quibbles here. First, the scale of the Y-axis dramatically softens the dip in numbers from 2025-2030. Second, starting the X axis at 2025 conveniently hides the fact that there were nearly 10,000 VLS cells in the fleet in 2021, a figure even the “Alternative 3” approach only returns to in the late 2030’s. See graphic below, top left.

  

• This plan appears to suggest that the DDG 51 funding profile and multi-year procurement request is 2 per year over the course of the FYDP, although the FY23 budget request suggested that the tenth ship would be an “option”. The transition to DDG(X) is to occur “about” 2030, though there will be little support for doing so either in Congress or in industry given that neither Alternative 1 or 2 sticks to a 2 ships per year profile in the “transition” period that would encompass the first DDG(X) acquisition.

• On page 14, the FFG(X) profile (1/2/1/2/1) for FY23-27 is restructured due to affordability and design maturation, both of which are attributable to the government, not the shipyard. Again, even under alternative 3, the most FFGX’s considered in any year is 3, and that is not until 2037. No profile provides any incentive for a second yard, removing the prospect for competitive pressure on pricing.

• There is precious little (no) attention being given to expeditionary ship repair. There are submarine tenders in the mix (sustained requirement for 4), but there are zero surface ship tenders. No one who thinks about war in the Pacific does so without thinking hard about expeditionary ship repair. But here we are.