You ended your earlier piece by saying that we needed to be a serious nation again and take our Navy seriously again. This 30-year plan is another reminder that the current administration and most members of Congress don’t take either seriously.
Perhaps one of the saddest and starkest reminders of this fact is the annual nonsense of continuing resolution followed by ramming a slipshod omnibus budget through six months late. If we are ever to grow our Navy to meaningfully be able to maintain the kind of forward presence that would deter China, while still maintaining the fleet properly, Congress cannot continue to approach defense funding in such a haphazard way.
“ In fact, the fleet shrinks from 297 to 280 in the current FYDP. ”
This is the height of unseriousness. I don’t blame the Navy at all. I blame Congress and the current (and previous two) administrations. The men and women who worked on this plan are faced with the perennial challenge that their civilian government makes it impossible for them to realistically meet their goals.
“ Again, even under alternative 3, the most FFGX’s considered in any year is 3, and that is not until 2037. No profile provides any incentive for a second yard, removing the prospect for competitive pressure on pricing.”
As a layman, I can see that’s a serious mistake. I followed the FFGX and there was a period where there was a bit of chatter about the prospect of a second shipyard. Now, no chance?
“ Recapitalizing the SSBN force is described thusly: “The once in a generation recapitalization of the Nation’s most survivable leg of the nuclear triad comes at the same time as the Navy modernizes for future threats, placing strain across the Navy’s budget”.”
This sounds like an excuse. I’m already disappointed with the recapitalization (probably not the Navy’s fault and not the shipyards’ either). I’d like to see 2-3 more SSBNs and I wish we’d started 4-5 years earlier.
“ Additionally, calling LAW/counting LAW as an “Amphibious Warfare Ship” in the “Long Range Procurement Profiles” is a stretch. The platform ought more appropriately be counted among “Support Ships”.”
That makes sense.
“ Alternative 1 tends to offer less pain to large combatants, alternative 2 less pain to SSN’s.”
My gut reaction would be to pick alternative 2, then, but neither is ideal.
“ It is hard not to conclude that what transpired between the Navy and OSD was a conversation that went something like this.”
I think that’s probably accurate.
Thank you for taking this plan seriously and breaking it down for us. I appreciate the fact that you share your thoughts here on Substack for the general public. I wish more people I knew paid attention to these issues.
The threat has definitely changed and value of the Navy is different, but Knudson and Kaiser must be turning over in their graves. Not sure we will see what happen in the early 40s with shipbuilding. Good read
You ended your earlier piece by saying that we needed to be a serious nation again and take our Navy seriously again. This 30-year plan is another reminder that the current administration and most members of Congress don’t take either seriously.
Perhaps one of the saddest and starkest reminders of this fact is the annual nonsense of continuing resolution followed by ramming a slipshod omnibus budget through six months late. If we are ever to grow our Navy to meaningfully be able to maintain the kind of forward presence that would deter China, while still maintaining the fleet properly, Congress cannot continue to approach defense funding in such a haphazard way.
“ In fact, the fleet shrinks from 297 to 280 in the current FYDP. ”
This is the height of unseriousness. I don’t blame the Navy at all. I blame Congress and the current (and previous two) administrations. The men and women who worked on this plan are faced with the perennial challenge that their civilian government makes it impossible for them to realistically meet their goals.
“ Again, even under alternative 3, the most FFGX’s considered in any year is 3, and that is not until 2037. No profile provides any incentive for a second yard, removing the prospect for competitive pressure on pricing.”
As a layman, I can see that’s a serious mistake. I followed the FFGX and there was a period where there was a bit of chatter about the prospect of a second shipyard. Now, no chance?
“ Recapitalizing the SSBN force is described thusly: “The once in a generation recapitalization of the Nation’s most survivable leg of the nuclear triad comes at the same time as the Navy modernizes for future threats, placing strain across the Navy’s budget”.”
This sounds like an excuse. I’m already disappointed with the recapitalization (probably not the Navy’s fault and not the shipyards’ either). I’d like to see 2-3 more SSBNs and I wish we’d started 4-5 years earlier.
“ Additionally, calling LAW/counting LAW as an “Amphibious Warfare Ship” in the “Long Range Procurement Profiles” is a stretch. The platform ought more appropriately be counted among “Support Ships”.”
That makes sense.
“ Alternative 1 tends to offer less pain to large combatants, alternative 2 less pain to SSN’s.”
My gut reaction would be to pick alternative 2, then, but neither is ideal.
“ It is hard not to conclude that what transpired between the Navy and OSD was a conversation that went something like this.”
I think that’s probably accurate.
Thank you for taking this plan seriously and breaking it down for us. I appreciate the fact that you share your thoughts here on Substack for the general public. I wish more people I knew paid attention to these issues.
The threat has definitely changed and value of the Navy is different, but Knudson and Kaiser must be turning over in their graves. Not sure we will see what happen in the early 40s with shipbuilding. Good read