Former Marine officer here. My understanding of the MEU/ARG concept and numbers has always been that we had a standing requirement for 3 MEU afloat, and that this required 9 MEU worth of ships, or 27.
The 4th tranche you cite, those en route to replace others on station, come from those coming off station.
When a MEU goes into workup for deployment, that period of time includes the transit to the assigned AO. Once arrived, the relieved units period of down-time, or recovery, includes the transit time back.
This is reduced by the fact that 1/3 of our MEU's are based in Japan, so transit time for those forces is far less to their AO.
My understanding was always that the 38/39 ship requirement was based on the MEB lift, not the MEU presence.
I believe we could ensure a 3 MEU presence with only 30 or 31 hulls, but we cannot provide the needed lift for the multi MEB response requirement.
However, all of that is really moot.
The Marine Corps lacks a credible amphibious assault craft for forcible entry.
Our Ospreys are grounded, the AAV is prohibited from operations in water, and the ACV is an 8 wheeled toy that rolls over in moderate surf.
And neither the AAV nor the ACV provides over-the-horizon landing capacity, so we CANNOT conduct amphibious assault in any scenario in which the adversary possesses even modest ASCM or ASBM capabilities.
For some reason, the USMC developed the idea that we need a mechanized capacity ashore. This was a cold-war legacy of the Marines desire to be able to be "the other, better, Army".
It is NOT a well founded requirement. Especially in INDOPACOM, where the overwhelming majority of targets for amphibious assault will be tiny islands on which there is No Need for mechanized support ashore.
Even if we had been able to perfect the AAAV and achieve performance like the Chinese have with their Type-05 (and afford it), we are still stuck with relatively slow craft carrying few troops, and requiring the Assault ships to approach within easy ASCM range of shore.
The Marines need to go back to Non mechanized landing craft. Meaning they are BOATS that take Marines to shore, quickly, from far out at sea.
Many nations have available combat craft that could serve these requirements, and we have worked with them in the Baltic and other places. Small, fast combat craft able to carry 20-30 combat equipped Marines up to the beach, from 50nm off-shore, would be both much cheaper and much more viable in nearly every scenario, and would force our adversary to calculate for a MEU or MEB capacity to hit multiple islands in strength simultaneously without moving our ARG vessels into risk-range of their ASCM/ASBM.
I personally am in love with the idea of a submersible landing craft, based on the simplistic semi-submersibles built by drug runners.
We need Marines ashore. Lots of them. We don't need swimming APC's.
I am convinced that the future of warfare is Infantry based, and anything larger than a man will be dead, fast. Technology has allowed for far smaller guided and controlled weapons.
Just look for the Ukrainians use drones to chase down individual soldiers.
That means mobility will have to be individual based. I'm not predicting the overnight death of tanks and APC's, but the smart money is on improving the mobility and survivability of the individual infantryman.
I think e-bikes or comparable are the near-future of infantry movement in most circumstances, with the idea being that they are used to move the infantry rapidly to the line of departure, after which they fight on foot. Thinks like the Polaris Dagor are also excellent.
We are rapidly approaching the point at which APC's/IFV's are there for just the same thing - survival transport to the line of departure + area supporting direct fires.
The CB90 is a solution available TODAY, and we should be building them by the bucketload.
But for offensive landings, we don't need tracks or even scooters.
To land in the face of determined opposition you need 3 things
Numbers, Cover/concealment and Firepower.
That means your landing craft, whatever they are, must mount LOTS of smoke launchers and multiple heavy MG's or MachineGrenade Launchers, able to suppress enemy positions while the infantry move up and kill them.
This is also where small drone ground vehicles come in. lightweight, tracked or wheeled vehicles the size of a 1 person ATV, with a M240 or a Mk19. Also with extra smoke launchers and able to carry some extra ammo cans.
I would like to apologize to the ACMC General Mahoney for calling him in an earlier iteration of this piece the "Acting Commodore". Horror of horrors, I have slandered a man.
I actually land on an LHA every 4 LPD every 2 in my 600 ship plans, but at 40 year lives that is only 30 ships. The LSM needs to be on the larger end of what they are talking such they can pick up some of the slack.
To add to this melee, is the schizophrenic “Light Carrier” concept that seems to ignore a standard ACE not being all Harriers or F-35B’s. If there is to be any further investment in this concept, the Gators need to excluded from it. And no well decks on LHA’s? What’s been the impact of that; especially when the ARG is disaggregated?
We could have funded our Navy/Marine requirements, and even have gold-plated it, with all the money we have spent since January 2021 on the Welcome Wagon for illegal immigrants and propping up an Eastern European kleptocracy in what was an avoidable war with its neighbor. The size of the pie is finite. The people apportioning the slices just aren't doing a good job, but they seem to have a consensus that their poll numbers are acceptable. *sigh*
Sir, another great article, thanks. In reference to your comment about not understanding the difference between a MEU and a MEB, a MEU 3.0 basically fits the description. A MEB HAD a Regimental Landing Team; a larger Composite Squadron, although not necessarily 3X as large, and a Regimental size Combat Logistics function. The next step up was a MEF, which included a Division, an entire Air Wing, and a Force Logistics Group. Since everyone knows Marines aren't the sharpest tacks on the block, we have to be able to count the number of elements using our fingers and toes. Once you're past that number, we're just lost... ;) Semper Fidelis! CWO4 USMCR [Ret] 17 Feb 1969 - 1 August 2004
Points well taken. I would only note that "for nearly fifteen years, the Navy underfunded maintenance and spare parts on these ships, even as they were being operated at an elevated level of use. As a result, ships aged faster than they were designed to age, and the readiness of the force declined.",While this is perfectly correct, it should note that the comment refers to all Navy ships not just Amphibs. We are all in a hole--still digging--not just the Gators.
So it sounds like the USMC will join the US Army Forces Command Global Response Force, riding US Air Force transports to hotspots around the world, 18 hours after notification? Not an easy task. Why not add force structure to the Army (assuming they can recruit the troops) since the Army already has the skills and TTPs to accomplish this mission? Better use of taxpayer $'s !!
There are fundamental differences in basic force structure that most people outside grunt land don't understand.
Army infantry forces are all classified as either 'light' (Airborne, air assault, mountain) or 'mechanized'
All Army Infantry units are built upon a core structure of an Infantry squad composed of 2 fire teams and a squad leader (9 men) and 3 squads in a platoon.
Marine Infantry formations are built on a squad of THREE fire teams. A Marine squad is 13 men, and in many case 14 or 15 with Corpsman and new attachments.
Army thinking sees all non-mechanized Infantry formations as 'Light'.
Marines are not 'Light' Infantry.
We are ASSAULT Infantry. Forcible amphibious landing is an ASSAULT role. It is inherently offensive and implies higher levels of casualties.
Many people don't understand that no matter how many battalions or brigades you have in the fight, ALL Infantry battles are Squad and Platoon level engagements.
These are the forces that close with and destroy the enemy in the close fight. And they take casualties. It is impossible to do that mission without it.
Most infantry squads will become combat ineffective after 25-30% casualties. Once you account for troops caring for or transporting wounded soldiers, the squad loses its momentum and ceases to be able to prosecute the attack. The attack stalls. next-level leaders have to try to maneuver and rotate other units in to replace the stalled unit. The attack fails.
Marine Infantry units have 50% more grunts at the squad level for the specific reason that we are designed to be able to take more casualties and stay in the fight longer. This was a hard lesson learned in the sands of Tarawa and other Pacific islands.
Forcible entry of that nature is NOT a mission the Army is prepared to carry out.
The only formation in the Army that prepared for that level of mission was the 75th Ranger Regiment, which during the Cold-War was the premier force tasked with forcible air-field seizure, the airborne equivalent to landing on a defended beach.
For 25 years, 75th Ranger has become the Rapid Reaction support to SOCOM, and to my understanding no longer prioritizes this mission set.
The 75th, in fact, can accomplish this mission. It may not be a priority, as William suggests, but capable nevertheless. Convenience is not why the Rangers are the SOCOM RF.
With respect, what has the USMC made a priority these days? I still can't see it. In any case, the 75th is not an assault force on the scale of an MEU and we need them to maintain some serious capacity to assault.
Respectfully, the Army most certainly does have the skills and TTPs for Joint Forcible Entry and has provided the trained and ready forces to accomplish the Global Response Force (GRF) mission - for a very long time.
If the Marines aren't going to have the ships available to "get there" to conduct and support ops, how are they going to accomplish their mission?
Seems like the marine littoral regiments will have to ride planes into their AOR. If that's the case - how is that different from the Army (non-airborne)infantry brigade combat teams in the GRF?
The Army GRF mission was created after Gen Berger dissolved the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force – Crisis Response for both Central, Africa and South as funding continued to get poured into the V-22 and then the blackhole of the ACV program. While the USMC units would be versed with ships nearby, the Army is entirely reliant on an airbridge for its sustainment. The evacuation of the US embassy in Khartoum in '23 highlighted the USMC's inability to deploy, and the clumsiness of the Army, thus it became a USSOCOM mission.
Bryan,
Former Marine officer here. My understanding of the MEU/ARG concept and numbers has always been that we had a standing requirement for 3 MEU afloat, and that this required 9 MEU worth of ships, or 27.
The 4th tranche you cite, those en route to replace others on station, come from those coming off station.
When a MEU goes into workup for deployment, that period of time includes the transit to the assigned AO. Once arrived, the relieved units period of down-time, or recovery, includes the transit time back.
This is reduced by the fact that 1/3 of our MEU's are based in Japan, so transit time for those forces is far less to their AO.
My understanding was always that the 38/39 ship requirement was based on the MEB lift, not the MEU presence.
I believe we could ensure a 3 MEU presence with only 30 or 31 hulls, but we cannot provide the needed lift for the multi MEB response requirement.
However, all of that is really moot.
The Marine Corps lacks a credible amphibious assault craft for forcible entry.
Our Ospreys are grounded, the AAV is prohibited from operations in water, and the ACV is an 8 wheeled toy that rolls over in moderate surf.
And neither the AAV nor the ACV provides over-the-horizon landing capacity, so we CANNOT conduct amphibious assault in any scenario in which the adversary possesses even modest ASCM or ASBM capabilities.
For some reason, the USMC developed the idea that we need a mechanized capacity ashore. This was a cold-war legacy of the Marines desire to be able to be "the other, better, Army".
It is NOT a well founded requirement. Especially in INDOPACOM, where the overwhelming majority of targets for amphibious assault will be tiny islands on which there is No Need for mechanized support ashore.
Even if we had been able to perfect the AAAV and achieve performance like the Chinese have with their Type-05 (and afford it), we are still stuck with relatively slow craft carrying few troops, and requiring the Assault ships to approach within easy ASCM range of shore.
The Marines need to go back to Non mechanized landing craft. Meaning they are BOATS that take Marines to shore, quickly, from far out at sea.
Many nations have available combat craft that could serve these requirements, and we have worked with them in the Baltic and other places. Small, fast combat craft able to carry 20-30 combat equipped Marines up to the beach, from 50nm off-shore, would be both much cheaper and much more viable in nearly every scenario, and would force our adversary to calculate for a MEU or MEB capacity to hit multiple islands in strength simultaneously without moving our ARG vessels into risk-range of their ASCM/ASBM.
I personally am in love with the idea of a submersible landing craft, based on the simplistic semi-submersibles built by drug runners.
We need Marines ashore. Lots of them. We don't need swimming APC's.
Someone needs to figure out how to add tracks to a CB90 or load them full of infantry with e-bikes or e-scooters.
I am convinced that the future of warfare is Infantry based, and anything larger than a man will be dead, fast. Technology has allowed for far smaller guided and controlled weapons.
Just look for the Ukrainians use drones to chase down individual soldiers.
That means mobility will have to be individual based. I'm not predicting the overnight death of tanks and APC's, but the smart money is on improving the mobility and survivability of the individual infantryman.
I think e-bikes or comparable are the near-future of infantry movement in most circumstances, with the idea being that they are used to move the infantry rapidly to the line of departure, after which they fight on foot. Thinks like the Polaris Dagor are also excellent.
We are rapidly approaching the point at which APC's/IFV's are there for just the same thing - survival transport to the line of departure + area supporting direct fires.
The CB90 is a solution available TODAY, and we should be building them by the bucketload.
But for offensive landings, we don't need tracks or even scooters.
To land in the face of determined opposition you need 3 things
Numbers, Cover/concealment and Firepower.
That means your landing craft, whatever they are, must mount LOTS of smoke launchers and multiple heavy MG's or MachineGrenade Launchers, able to suppress enemy positions while the infantry move up and kill them.
This is also where small drone ground vehicles come in. lightweight, tracked or wheeled vehicles the size of a 1 person ATV, with a M240 or a Mk19. Also with extra smoke launchers and able to carry some extra ammo cans.
Same idea for CASEVAC, drone litter carrier.
I would like to apologize to the ACMC General Mahoney for calling him in an earlier iteration of this piece the "Acting Commodore". Horror of horrors, I have slandered a man.
I actually land on an LHA every 4 LPD every 2 in my 600 ship plans, but at 40 year lives that is only 30 ships. The LSM needs to be on the larger end of what they are talking such they can pick up some of the slack.
To add to this melee, is the schizophrenic “Light Carrier” concept that seems to ignore a standard ACE not being all Harriers or F-35B’s. If there is to be any further investment in this concept, the Gators need to excluded from it. And no well decks on LHA’s? What’s been the impact of that; especially when the ARG is disaggregated?
We could have funded our Navy/Marine requirements, and even have gold-plated it, with all the money we have spent since January 2021 on the Welcome Wagon for illegal immigrants and propping up an Eastern European kleptocracy in what was an avoidable war with its neighbor. The size of the pie is finite. The people apportioning the slices just aren't doing a good job, but they seem to have a consensus that their poll numbers are acceptable. *sigh*
I'm not sure I understand any better. That said, you can explain it to me, you can't understand if for me.
More, Faster, Please!
Sir, another great article, thanks. In reference to your comment about not understanding the difference between a MEU and a MEB, a MEU 3.0 basically fits the description. A MEB HAD a Regimental Landing Team; a larger Composite Squadron, although not necessarily 3X as large, and a Regimental size Combat Logistics function. The next step up was a MEF, which included a Division, an entire Air Wing, and a Force Logistics Group. Since everyone knows Marines aren't the sharpest tacks on the block, we have to be able to count the number of elements using our fingers and toes. Once you're past that number, we're just lost... ;) Semper Fidelis! CWO4 USMCR [Ret] 17 Feb 1969 - 1 August 2004
M-uscles
A-re
R-equired
I-nteligence
N-ot
E-ssential
After serving 32 years myself I have to agree with the esteemed warrant officer.
As a former infantry Marine I can say you never use the words infantry and stupid in the same sentence as it’s redundant…
Points well taken. I would only note that "for nearly fifteen years, the Navy underfunded maintenance and spare parts on these ships, even as they were being operated at an elevated level of use. As a result, ships aged faster than they were designed to age, and the readiness of the force declined.",While this is perfectly correct, it should note that the comment refers to all Navy ships not just Amphibs. We are all in a hole--still digging--not just the Gators.
So it sounds like the USMC will join the US Army Forces Command Global Response Force, riding US Air Force transports to hotspots around the world, 18 hours after notification? Not an easy task. Why not add force structure to the Army (assuming they can recruit the troops) since the Army already has the skills and TTPs to accomplish this mission? Better use of taxpayer $'s !!
Steve,
There are fundamental differences in basic force structure that most people outside grunt land don't understand.
Army infantry forces are all classified as either 'light' (Airborne, air assault, mountain) or 'mechanized'
All Army Infantry units are built upon a core structure of an Infantry squad composed of 2 fire teams and a squad leader (9 men) and 3 squads in a platoon.
Marine Infantry formations are built on a squad of THREE fire teams. A Marine squad is 13 men, and in many case 14 or 15 with Corpsman and new attachments.
Army thinking sees all non-mechanized Infantry formations as 'Light'.
Marines are not 'Light' Infantry.
We are ASSAULT Infantry. Forcible amphibious landing is an ASSAULT role. It is inherently offensive and implies higher levels of casualties.
Many people don't understand that no matter how many battalions or brigades you have in the fight, ALL Infantry battles are Squad and Platoon level engagements.
These are the forces that close with and destroy the enemy in the close fight. And they take casualties. It is impossible to do that mission without it.
Most infantry squads will become combat ineffective after 25-30% casualties. Once you account for troops caring for or transporting wounded soldiers, the squad loses its momentum and ceases to be able to prosecute the attack. The attack stalls. next-level leaders have to try to maneuver and rotate other units in to replace the stalled unit. The attack fails.
Marine Infantry units have 50% more grunts at the squad level for the specific reason that we are designed to be able to take more casualties and stay in the fight longer. This was a hard lesson learned in the sands of Tarawa and other Pacific islands.
Forcible entry of that nature is NOT a mission the Army is prepared to carry out.
The only formation in the Army that prepared for that level of mission was the 75th Ranger Regiment, which during the Cold-War was the premier force tasked with forcible air-field seizure, the airborne equivalent to landing on a defended beach.
For 25 years, 75th Ranger has become the Rapid Reaction support to SOCOM, and to my understanding no longer prioritizes this mission set.
Because the Army does not have the skills and TTP's to accomplish this mission.
The 75th, in fact, can accomplish this mission. It may not be a priority, as William suggests, but capable nevertheless. Convenience is not why the Rangers are the SOCOM RF.
With respect, what has the USMC made a priority these days? I still can't see it. In any case, the 75th is not an assault force on the scale of an MEU and we need them to maintain some serious capacity to assault.
Respectfully, the Army most certainly does have the skills and TTPs for Joint Forcible Entry and has provided the trained and ready forces to accomplish the Global Response Force (GRF) mission - for a very long time.
If the Marines aren't going to have the ships available to "get there" to conduct and support ops, how are they going to accomplish their mission?
Seems like the marine littoral regiments will have to ride planes into their AOR. If that's the case - how is that different from the Army (non-airborne)infantry brigade combat teams in the GRF?
The Army GRF mission was created after Gen Berger dissolved the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force – Crisis Response for both Central, Africa and South as funding continued to get poured into the V-22 and then the blackhole of the ACV program. While the USMC units would be versed with ships nearby, the Army is entirely reliant on an airbridge for its sustainment. The evacuation of the US embassy in Khartoum in '23 highlighted the USMC's inability to deploy, and the clumsiness of the Army, thus it became a USSOCOM mission.
Thank you for a terrific assessment on the 3.0 MEU requirements.
My pleasure. Thank you.