Former Marine officer here. My understanding of the MEU/ARG concept and numbers has always been that we had a standing requirement for 3 MEU afloat, and that this required 9 MEU worth of ships, or 27.
The 4th tranche you cite, those en route to replace others on station, come from those coming off station.
When a MEU goes into workup for deployment, that period of time includes the transit to the assigned AO. Once arrived, the relieved units period of down-time, or recovery, includes the transit time back.
This is reduced by the fact that 1/3 of our MEU's are based in Japan, so transit time for those forces is far less to their AO.
My understanding was always that the 38/39 ship requirement was based on the MEB lift, not the MEU presence.
I believe we could ensure a 3 MEU presence with only 30 or 31 hulls, but we cannot provide the needed lift for the multi MEB response requirement.
However, all of that is really moot.
The Marine Corps lacks a credible amphibious assault craft for forcible entry.
Our Ospreys are grounded, the AAV is prohibited from operations in water, and the ACV is an 8 wheeled toy that rolls over in moderate surf.
And neither the AAV nor the ACV provides over-the-horizon landing capacity, so we CANNOT conduct amphibious assault in any scenario in which the adversary possesses even modest ASCM or ASBM capabilities.
For some reason, the USMC developed the idea that we need a mechanized capacity ashore. This was a cold-war legacy of the Marines desire to be able to be "the other, better, Army".
It is NOT a well founded requirement. Especially in INDOPACOM, where the overwhelming majority of targets for amphibious assault will be tiny islands on which there is No Need for mechanized support ashore.
Even if we had been able to perfect the AAAV and achieve performance like the Chinese have with their Type-05 (and afford it), we are still stuck with relatively slow craft carrying few troops, and requiring the Assault ships to approach within easy ASCM range of shore.
The Marines need to go back to Non mechanized landing craft. Meaning they are BOATS that take Marines to shore, quickly, from far out at sea.
Many nations have available combat craft that could serve these requirements, and we have worked with them in the Baltic and other places. Small, fast combat craft able to carry 20-30 combat equipped Marines up to the beach, from 50nm off-shore, would be both much cheaper and much more viable in nearly every scenario, and would force our adversary to calculate for a MEU or MEB capacity to hit multiple islands in strength simultaneously without moving our ARG vessels into risk-range of their ASCM/ASBM.
I personally am in love with the idea of a submersible landing craft, based on the simplistic semi-submersibles built by drug runners.
We need Marines ashore. Lots of them. We don't need swimming APC's.
I would like to apologize to the ACMC General Mahoney for calling him in an earlier iteration of this piece the "Acting Commodore". Horror of horrors, I have slandered a man.
I actually land on an LHA every 4 LPD every 2 in my 600 ship plans, but at 40 year lives that is only 30 ships. The LSM needs to be on the larger end of what they are talking such they can pick up some of the slack.
To add to this melee, is the schizophrenic “Light Carrier” concept that seems to ignore a standard ACE not being all Harriers or F-35B’s. If there is to be any further investment in this concept, the Gators need to excluded from it. And no well decks on LHA’s? What’s been the impact of that; especially when the ARG is disaggregated?
We could have funded our Navy/Marine requirements, and even have gold-plated it, with all the money we have spent since January 2021 on the Welcome Wagon for illegal immigrants and propping up an Eastern European kleptocracy in what was an avoidable war with its neighbor. The size of the pie is finite. The people apportioning the slices just aren't doing a good job, but they seem to have a consensus that their poll numbers are acceptable. *sigh*
Sir, another great article, thanks. In reference to your comment about not understanding the difference between a MEU and a MEB, a MEU 3.0 basically fits the description. A MEB HAD a Regimental Landing Team; a larger Composite Squadron, although not necessarily 3X as large, and a Regimental size Combat Logistics function. The next step up was a MEF, which included a Division, an entire Air Wing, and a Force Logistics Group. Since everyone knows Marines aren't the sharpest tacks on the block, we have to be able to count the number of elements using our fingers and toes. Once you're past that number, we're just lost... ;) Semper Fidelis! CWO4 USMCR [Ret] 17 Feb 1969 - 1 August 2004
Points well taken. I would only note that "for nearly fifteen years, the Navy underfunded maintenance and spare parts on these ships, even as they were being operated at an elevated level of use. As a result, ships aged faster than they were designed to age, and the readiness of the force declined.",While this is perfectly correct, it should note that the comment refers to all Navy ships not just Amphibs. We are all in a hole--still digging--not just the Gators.
So it sounds like the USMC will join the US Army Forces Command Global Response Force, riding US Air Force transports to hotspots around the world, 18 hours after notification? Not an easy task. Why not add force structure to the Army (assuming they can recruit the troops) since the Army already has the skills and TTPs to accomplish this mission? Better use of taxpayer $'s !!
Bryan,
Former Marine officer here. My understanding of the MEU/ARG concept and numbers has always been that we had a standing requirement for 3 MEU afloat, and that this required 9 MEU worth of ships, or 27.
The 4th tranche you cite, those en route to replace others on station, come from those coming off station.
When a MEU goes into workup for deployment, that period of time includes the transit to the assigned AO. Once arrived, the relieved units period of down-time, or recovery, includes the transit time back.
This is reduced by the fact that 1/3 of our MEU's are based in Japan, so transit time for those forces is far less to their AO.
My understanding was always that the 38/39 ship requirement was based on the MEB lift, not the MEU presence.
I believe we could ensure a 3 MEU presence with only 30 or 31 hulls, but we cannot provide the needed lift for the multi MEB response requirement.
However, all of that is really moot.
The Marine Corps lacks a credible amphibious assault craft for forcible entry.
Our Ospreys are grounded, the AAV is prohibited from operations in water, and the ACV is an 8 wheeled toy that rolls over in moderate surf.
And neither the AAV nor the ACV provides over-the-horizon landing capacity, so we CANNOT conduct amphibious assault in any scenario in which the adversary possesses even modest ASCM or ASBM capabilities.
For some reason, the USMC developed the idea that we need a mechanized capacity ashore. This was a cold-war legacy of the Marines desire to be able to be "the other, better, Army".
It is NOT a well founded requirement. Especially in INDOPACOM, where the overwhelming majority of targets for amphibious assault will be tiny islands on which there is No Need for mechanized support ashore.
Even if we had been able to perfect the AAAV and achieve performance like the Chinese have with their Type-05 (and afford it), we are still stuck with relatively slow craft carrying few troops, and requiring the Assault ships to approach within easy ASCM range of shore.
The Marines need to go back to Non mechanized landing craft. Meaning they are BOATS that take Marines to shore, quickly, from far out at sea.
Many nations have available combat craft that could serve these requirements, and we have worked with them in the Baltic and other places. Small, fast combat craft able to carry 20-30 combat equipped Marines up to the beach, from 50nm off-shore, would be both much cheaper and much more viable in nearly every scenario, and would force our adversary to calculate for a MEU or MEB capacity to hit multiple islands in strength simultaneously without moving our ARG vessels into risk-range of their ASCM/ASBM.
I personally am in love with the idea of a submersible landing craft, based on the simplistic semi-submersibles built by drug runners.
We need Marines ashore. Lots of them. We don't need swimming APC's.
I would like to apologize to the ACMC General Mahoney for calling him in an earlier iteration of this piece the "Acting Commodore". Horror of horrors, I have slandered a man.
I actually land on an LHA every 4 LPD every 2 in my 600 ship plans, but at 40 year lives that is only 30 ships. The LSM needs to be on the larger end of what they are talking such they can pick up some of the slack.
To add to this melee, is the schizophrenic “Light Carrier” concept that seems to ignore a standard ACE not being all Harriers or F-35B’s. If there is to be any further investment in this concept, the Gators need to excluded from it. And no well decks on LHA’s? What’s been the impact of that; especially when the ARG is disaggregated?
We could have funded our Navy/Marine requirements, and even have gold-plated it, with all the money we have spent since January 2021 on the Welcome Wagon for illegal immigrants and propping up an Eastern European kleptocracy in what was an avoidable war with its neighbor. The size of the pie is finite. The people apportioning the slices just aren't doing a good job, but they seem to have a consensus that their poll numbers are acceptable. *sigh*
I'm not sure I understand any better. That said, you can explain it to me, you can't understand if for me.
More, Faster, Please!
Sir, another great article, thanks. In reference to your comment about not understanding the difference between a MEU and a MEB, a MEU 3.0 basically fits the description. A MEB HAD a Regimental Landing Team; a larger Composite Squadron, although not necessarily 3X as large, and a Regimental size Combat Logistics function. The next step up was a MEF, which included a Division, an entire Air Wing, and a Force Logistics Group. Since everyone knows Marines aren't the sharpest tacks on the block, we have to be able to count the number of elements using our fingers and toes. Once you're past that number, we're just lost... ;) Semper Fidelis! CWO4 USMCR [Ret] 17 Feb 1969 - 1 August 2004
Points well taken. I would only note that "for nearly fifteen years, the Navy underfunded maintenance and spare parts on these ships, even as they were being operated at an elevated level of use. As a result, ships aged faster than they were designed to age, and the readiness of the force declined.",While this is perfectly correct, it should note that the comment refers to all Navy ships not just Amphibs. We are all in a hole--still digging--not just the Gators.
So it sounds like the USMC will join the US Army Forces Command Global Response Force, riding US Air Force transports to hotspots around the world, 18 hours after notification? Not an easy task. Why not add force structure to the Army (assuming they can recruit the troops) since the Army already has the skills and TTPs to accomplish this mission? Better use of taxpayer $'s !!
Thank you for a terrific assessment on the 3.0 MEU requirements.