Ever since I heard about the procurement delay for the next CVN, Ive had a nagging and undefined idea about what might be going on, but I couldn't quite decipher and pin it down. As soon as I got to "starve the beast", it finally made sense!! I think thats absolutely whats happening!!
There are a lot of problems with our force structure, procurement, and priorities. We've made our airwings less diverse, less capable, and smaller. And while doing so, the threats and area denial capabilities that a CVBG will face have grown significantly. But in spite of that, calling carriers "legacy" platforms is at least decades premature, and theyre still the Navys premier platform for the foreseeable future. Quietly plotting for naval avaition to wither and die on the vine is almost criminally shortsighted, especially without some kind of replacement even being proposed. AI, drones, networks, unmanned this or that- its all vaporware and pipe dreams with little or no combat value, and will be for a long time. Everyone is on the 'tech for techs sake' bandwagon, and we've seemingly forgotten that winning a fight boils down to huge amounts of explosives on target. So if theres a plot to kill the CVN roaming the Pentagon halls, whats the new alternative?? Is there one? Is someone sold on Orcas and Sea Hunters being the Navy of the future?? I hope not, but...
Two points I learned from my Navy Captain dad: 1) No matter what changes take place in the world, the seas are the same size—that never changes—the sea lines have to be protected and maintained. And 2) The US Navy now has more flag officers than it has ships. There is just something wrong with that picture.
When I was in high school, we had 16 CV carriers. Then we eventually got to 12, and now 11. Makes no sense. See above.
I’ll make my stock pitch. A pitch we are running short on time to implement.
- Don’t refuel Reagan and Bush. If possible move them to a reserve or mothball status.
- Buy 3 cvns in a block buy with keels laid every 32 months, matching the record set for Stennis. Use the manpower saved from RCOH to do so. We are already building 2 in the doc at the same time which was part of Rand’s plan to build faster. We may also want a second full size gantry crane to facilitate. Basically shoot for 10 newer carriers with fewer billets sooner. Then resume RCOH and grow the fleet or at least have the ability to make a real decision on fleet strength every 32 months instead of darn near forever. This can be done without necessrily spending more. It only costs more once you decide to grow or when you decide to dispose of the hulls.
Excellent article, thanks. A couple of notes: For many tears the Navy's bottom line for capitol ships (first BBs and now CVNs) was---15! Imagine that. The current level of funding--which drives ship numbers, as you note, is ideologically derived, and has very little to do with actual strategy or risk analysis as known by people who have actually studied defense matters. That ideology also leads to the current State Department policy of appeasement of aggressors.
I don't think you know what the word appeasement means. Last time I checked no one in state was handing over the Czech Republic (or other sovereign entity) to another coutry.
the policy of acceding to the demands of a potentially hostile nation in the hope of maintaining peace
the act of appeasing
That is a pretty good description of our current behavior towards Iran, for one. It also describes what we are trying to get Israel to do versus Hamas/Hezbollah, and Ukraine versus Russia.
Sure. We allow Iran to sell oil and pursue nuclear weapons essentially without interference, even though we have legal sanctions in place to prevent both. We insist upon believing--against all evidence and even according to its leaders--that Iran is a state that can be negotiated with and will actually do what it has promised. Ditto Russia. We are even now attempting to strong arm Israel into a ceasefire, which will preserve the Iranian backed Hamas and Hezbollah (and of course guarantee more aggression against Israel down the line). Our State Department keeps promoting a negotiated peace in Ukraine, apparently believing that Russia will actually follow the treaty from such negotiations this time. Yup, sounds a lot like Sudetenland is all we wish to me.
I have never heard anything about our State Department promoting a negotiated peace in Ukraine. Can you provide references / links / news articles about this? I've tried googling and nothing comes up.
Unfortunately the other poster keeps using that word, “appeasement”, but it doesn’t mean what he thinks it means. He should re-read a history of WWII, and focus on the Chamberlain government of the UK (as you suggested)…now that was appeasement.
I have spent sometime lately reading old issues of the Naval Institute and Proceedings. The July 2020 magazine has an article entitled "The Navy Must Prioritize Shipbuilding for the Future Force," by Captain James P. McGrath III, USN (retired). The following passages from the article I found very interesting. "Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Mike Gilday say he is prepared to build toward a 355 ship fleet if given more money." (page 58) "Building a fleet takes time, so when a nation goes to war, its navy must fight with the ships it has." (page 60) No disrespect but the leadership of the Navy seems to have made little progress on this situation. Just the humble opinion of an old hermit. (Page 91, has an article entitled "The U.S. Navy's Future Frigate," by Mr. Wertheim. My Mother taught me that if I don't have anything good to say, then don't say anything. I have nothing good to say about this program, so I will say nothing, sorry Navy.)
As usual, Bryan your analysis is good. There are a variety of reasons we can't seem to get to the force structure we need for our global commitments. As you note, CVBG numbers do not meet current needs and we continue to go in the wrong direction. There are a variety of reasons for that, not the least of which is the Navy' continued incompetence in shipbuilding. The latest debacle on getting the INDEPENDENCE Class FFG to sea is a good example. I've long felt DOD Procurement oversight is another culprit. It has limited value that is largely outweighed by onerous bureaucratic interference and non-value add policies. As many pundits seem to be fixated on, there are a variety of force structure options to include unmanned vehicles that can enhance our global combat power, however, they do not replace the need for flexible comphrensive combat power provided by a CVBG. you will note, I do not just focus on the CVN itself, it is a combination of the entire battle group that provides the full range of deployable options we need. The emergence of Hypersonic and ballistic missiles with complex maneuvering exceed what the air wing brings. I continue to lament the USN's decision to buy the LCS class ships that are not capable contributors. I was against the idea while serving on the Navy Staff in 2002-2004 and remain a skeptic today. They were never intended to be battle force assets and are not even fully capable of the missions they were designed for today. The addition of the mobile sea bases also provide some relief, but are not flexible enough to handle many of the challenges we face today. Keep fighting the good fight.
Good piece. Having too small of a Naval force in the face of a burgeoning threat is, in a word, provocative. Given the recent lack of a cogent diplomatic strategy in our State Department, it's dangerously so...
Would we even be able to recruit and train the people needed to man 11 or more CVA's? The current levels of Woke says, "No". And if we were given the ships could we keep them from harm even a friendly port? LHA-6 says, "No". Nah. If we built more CVA's they'd just get sent to 'Frisco and NYC to provide temporary shelter to the chronically homeless and illegal immigrants. Am hoping to be more optimistic after the November election. But it's a forlorn hope. : (
Wonderings? Are US companies capable of building an "increased" number of Navy ships in the foreseeable future? Could the US engage Japan, South Korea or others to build US Navy ships if US shipbuilders were unable to meet the need? How does the Jones Act of 1920 affect/limit the building of US Navy ships?
We’re not capable of building more ships within our industrial base. Labor, shipyard infrastructure, supplier networks are all lacking and overstretched and stressed beyond belief.
Double the SCN and SIOP MILCON for the next 30years, and we might have a shot. But those investments aren’t happening, much less the many more $B annually for people to crew these additional ships, home ports, ordnance, and ops and maintenance funding to own/operate/ and sustain them. Get rid of the Jones Act and allow Asian and European shipbuilders to compete directly (not like the shams that only allow foreign shipbuilders as subs to US shipyards - see LCS and Frigate), would be the smart market based play, but we’re too parochial and vain in our politics to do the right thing.
IMHO Navy needs to show Asian and European shipbuilders - and the US shipbuilders - that everything is open to competition when it comes to conventionally powered surface ships. The Austal EPF (the old JHSV) are already nearing the end of their service lives, having been used far above and beyond the operating profile they were originally designed for as ferries. And anything smaller than the super-tug is not a combat force ship that matters in Force Structure.
As an aside, trying to expand tier 1 shipbuilder capacity by awarding Marinette Marine to build a modified version of the Fincantieri frigate as the Constellation Class, has been a disaster. Designing and constructing combat force surface ships is hard, not something one just "adapts" or "modifies".
Nuc Subs and Carriers are probably never going to get outsourced overseas in the near to mid term. Subs are in great demand, but the industrial is more than tapped out; and only one Carrier designer/builder exists.
AUKUS and Australia building their own homegrown nuc subs is still a big TBD.
I think we've tried smaller ships as a "walk before you run" with some shipyards, and it has not been very successful. Maybe more full and open competition at all levels (except Nuc) is a risk worth taking.
MCMs and PCs were plenty useful and small. We all know that if speed were out of the equation LCS could meet all its KPIs on a slightly smaller hull. We had 8 yards originally bid for OPC and 5 for the rebid. I think it dropped to 5 partially because the CG picked the biggest design. Tighten it up and their could be a lot of competition and multiple yards building a common hull.
There is always the possibility of SLEP to hang onto the older hulls. Of course the Navy’s track record with the Ticos makes that moot. Maybe B-52s with new engines can replace CSG force projection (meant to be irony). The massive mis-allocation of resources for the climate jihad (our pacing threat?) make discussion of any logical NatSec policies academic. My head is exploding.
I know nothing about these topics. So, out of curiosity, how expensive does a ship have to be and how many potentially dead sailors need to be involved before losing said ship is basically just not an option? For those ships, are they useful if kept out of such kill zones?
Ever since I heard about the procurement delay for the next CVN, Ive had a nagging and undefined idea about what might be going on, but I couldn't quite decipher and pin it down. As soon as I got to "starve the beast", it finally made sense!! I think thats absolutely whats happening!!
There are a lot of problems with our force structure, procurement, and priorities. We've made our airwings less diverse, less capable, and smaller. And while doing so, the threats and area denial capabilities that a CVBG will face have grown significantly. But in spite of that, calling carriers "legacy" platforms is at least decades premature, and theyre still the Navys premier platform for the foreseeable future. Quietly plotting for naval avaition to wither and die on the vine is almost criminally shortsighted, especially without some kind of replacement even being proposed. AI, drones, networks, unmanned this or that- its all vaporware and pipe dreams with little or no combat value, and will be for a long time. Everyone is on the 'tech for techs sake' bandwagon, and we've seemingly forgotten that winning a fight boils down to huge amounts of explosives on target. So if theres a plot to kill the CVN roaming the Pentagon halls, whats the new alternative?? Is there one? Is someone sold on Orcas and Sea Hunters being the Navy of the future?? I hope not, but...
Two points I learned from my Navy Captain dad: 1) No matter what changes take place in the world, the seas are the same size—that never changes—the sea lines have to be protected and maintained. And 2) The US Navy now has more flag officers than it has ships. There is just something wrong with that picture.
When I was in high school, we had 16 CV carriers. Then we eventually got to 12, and now 11. Makes no sense. See above.
I’ll make my stock pitch. A pitch we are running short on time to implement.
- Don’t refuel Reagan and Bush. If possible move them to a reserve or mothball status.
- Buy 3 cvns in a block buy with keels laid every 32 months, matching the record set for Stennis. Use the manpower saved from RCOH to do so. We are already building 2 in the doc at the same time which was part of Rand’s plan to build faster. We may also want a second full size gantry crane to facilitate. Basically shoot for 10 newer carriers with fewer billets sooner. Then resume RCOH and grow the fleet or at least have the ability to make a real decision on fleet strength every 32 months instead of darn near forever. This can be done without necessrily spending more. It only costs more once you decide to grow or when you decide to dispose of the hulls.
There is some really serious thinking here. Thank you.
Here are 2 budgets I hashed out in 2022 with fleet design. The 9 CVNs would become 10 if we get the extended times before RCOH we have been seeing on the later Nimitz hulls for actual usage on Ford. https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1DOTBSdKsDoQeuZQz--qyTiHqAkA3DX-RAuU_xZCYaWY/edit?gid=0#gid=0.
Excellent article, thanks. A couple of notes: For many tears the Navy's bottom line for capitol ships (first BBs and now CVNs) was---15! Imagine that. The current level of funding--which drives ship numbers, as you note, is ideologically derived, and has very little to do with actual strategy or risk analysis as known by people who have actually studied defense matters. That ideology also leads to the current State Department policy of appeasement of aggressors.
I don't think you know what the word appeasement means. Last time I checked no one in state was handing over the Czech Republic (or other sovereign entity) to another coutry.
Dictionary.com:
noun
the policy of acceding to the demands of a potentially hostile nation in the hope of maintaining peace
the act of appeasing
That is a pretty good description of our current behavior towards Iran, for one. It also describes what we are trying to get Israel to do versus Hamas/Hezbollah, and Ukraine versus Russia.
Can you describe specifically how we are attempting to appease Russia? Or the others?
Sure. We allow Iran to sell oil and pursue nuclear weapons essentially without interference, even though we have legal sanctions in place to prevent both. We insist upon believing--against all evidence and even according to its leaders--that Iran is a state that can be negotiated with and will actually do what it has promised. Ditto Russia. We are even now attempting to strong arm Israel into a ceasefire, which will preserve the Iranian backed Hamas and Hezbollah (and of course guarantee more aggression against Israel down the line). Our State Department keeps promoting a negotiated peace in Ukraine, apparently believing that Russia will actually follow the treaty from such negotiations this time. Yup, sounds a lot like Sudetenland is all we wish to me.
I have never heard anything about our State Department promoting a negotiated peace in Ukraine. Can you provide references / links / news articles about this? I've tried googling and nothing comes up.
Here's one: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-european-officials-broach-topic-peace-negotiations-ukraine-sources-rcna123628.
More than just talk however, is action. We refuse to give Ukraine the weapons they need to actually prevail, but let them remain twisting in the wind.
You are spot on with your comments.
Unfortunately the other poster keeps using that word, “appeasement”, but it doesn’t mean what he thinks it means. He should re-read a history of WWII, and focus on the Chamberlain government of the UK (as you suggested)…now that was appeasement.
I have spent sometime lately reading old issues of the Naval Institute and Proceedings. The July 2020 magazine has an article entitled "The Navy Must Prioritize Shipbuilding for the Future Force," by Captain James P. McGrath III, USN (retired). The following passages from the article I found very interesting. "Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Mike Gilday say he is prepared to build toward a 355 ship fleet if given more money." (page 58) "Building a fleet takes time, so when a nation goes to war, its navy must fight with the ships it has." (page 60) No disrespect but the leadership of the Navy seems to have made little progress on this situation. Just the humble opinion of an old hermit. (Page 91, has an article entitled "The U.S. Navy's Future Frigate," by Mr. Wertheim. My Mother taught me that if I don't have anything good to say, then don't say anything. I have nothing good to say about this program, so I will say nothing, sorry Navy.)
As usual, Bryan your analysis is good. There are a variety of reasons we can't seem to get to the force structure we need for our global commitments. As you note, CVBG numbers do not meet current needs and we continue to go in the wrong direction. There are a variety of reasons for that, not the least of which is the Navy' continued incompetence in shipbuilding. The latest debacle on getting the INDEPENDENCE Class FFG to sea is a good example. I've long felt DOD Procurement oversight is another culprit. It has limited value that is largely outweighed by onerous bureaucratic interference and non-value add policies. As many pundits seem to be fixated on, there are a variety of force structure options to include unmanned vehicles that can enhance our global combat power, however, they do not replace the need for flexible comphrensive combat power provided by a CVBG. you will note, I do not just focus on the CVN itself, it is a combination of the entire battle group that provides the full range of deployable options we need. The emergence of Hypersonic and ballistic missiles with complex maneuvering exceed what the air wing brings. I continue to lament the USN's decision to buy the LCS class ships that are not capable contributors. I was against the idea while serving on the Navy Staff in 2002-2004 and remain a skeptic today. They were never intended to be battle force assets and are not even fully capable of the missions they were designed for today. The addition of the mobile sea bases also provide some relief, but are not flexible enough to handle many of the challenges we face today. Keep fighting the good fight.
Good piece. Having too small of a Naval force in the face of a burgeoning threat is, in a word, provocative. Given the recent lack of a cogent diplomatic strategy in our State Department, it's dangerously so...
Would we even be able to recruit and train the people needed to man 11 or more CVA's? The current levels of Woke says, "No". And if we were given the ships could we keep them from harm even a friendly port? LHA-6 says, "No". Nah. If we built more CVA's they'd just get sent to 'Frisco and NYC to provide temporary shelter to the chronically homeless and illegal immigrants. Am hoping to be more optimistic after the November election. But it's a forlorn hope. : (
Thank you for your continued efforts. More. Faster. Please.
Wonderings? Are US companies capable of building an "increased" number of Navy ships in the foreseeable future? Could the US engage Japan, South Korea or others to build US Navy ships if US shipbuilders were unable to meet the need? How does the Jones Act of 1920 affect/limit the building of US Navy ships?
We’re not capable of building more ships within our industrial base. Labor, shipyard infrastructure, supplier networks are all lacking and overstretched and stressed beyond belief.
Double the SCN and SIOP MILCON for the next 30years, and we might have a shot. But those investments aren’t happening, much less the many more $B annually for people to crew these additional ships, home ports, ordnance, and ops and maintenance funding to own/operate/ and sustain them. Get rid of the Jones Act and allow Asian and European shipbuilders to compete directly (not like the shams that only allow foreign shipbuilders as subs to US shipyards - see LCS and Frigate), would be the smart market based play, but we’re too parochial and vain in our politics to do the right thing.
I think we could make some headway with smaller ships. Somehing smaller than the ocean tugs under construction.
Smaller? You sure about that?
IMHO Navy needs to show Asian and European shipbuilders - and the US shipbuilders - that everything is open to competition when it comes to conventionally powered surface ships. The Austal EPF (the old JHSV) are already nearing the end of their service lives, having been used far above and beyond the operating profile they were originally designed for as ferries. And anything smaller than the super-tug is not a combat force ship that matters in Force Structure.
As an aside, trying to expand tier 1 shipbuilder capacity by awarding Marinette Marine to build a modified version of the Fincantieri frigate as the Constellation Class, has been a disaster. Designing and constructing combat force surface ships is hard, not something one just "adapts" or "modifies".
Nuc Subs and Carriers are probably never going to get outsourced overseas in the near to mid term. Subs are in great demand, but the industrial is more than tapped out; and only one Carrier designer/builder exists.
AUKUS and Australia building their own homegrown nuc subs is still a big TBD.
I think we've tried smaller ships as a "walk before you run" with some shipyards, and it has not been very successful. Maybe more full and open competition at all levels (except Nuc) is a risk worth taking.
MCMs and PCs were plenty useful and small. We all know that if speed were out of the equation LCS could meet all its KPIs on a slightly smaller hull. We had 8 yards originally bid for OPC and 5 for the rebid. I think it dropped to 5 partially because the CG picked the biggest design. Tighten it up and their could be a lot of competition and multiple yards building a common hull.
I see what you’re saying. And we do have to start somewhere to expand our industrial base if we look overseas.
There is always the possibility of SLEP to hang onto the older hulls. Of course the Navy’s track record with the Ticos makes that moot. Maybe B-52s with new engines can replace CSG force projection (meant to be irony). The massive mis-allocation of resources for the climate jihad (our pacing threat?) make discussion of any logical NatSec policies academic. My head is exploding.
I know nothing about these topics. So, out of curiosity, how expensive does a ship have to be and how many potentially dead sailors need to be involved before losing said ship is basically just not an option? For those ships, are they useful if kept out of such kill zones?
Ray Maybus.
Things have to get worse before they get better, unfortunately.
Thank you for a clear and cogent explanation why Washington is not serious about maintaining sea power and, more importantly, peace and prosperity.
Definitely a CBDR situation.